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INTRODUCTION

Generally, the development of the European Economic Community (EEC) into something more than a customs union has
progressed at a glacial pace typical of the development of most
modern political institutions. An exception to this general pattern,
however, is the development of EEC competition policy. In this
area new legal principles are being generated at a pace that may
well be exceeding the rate at which they can be digested by the
affected parties. The latest of these principles has developed from
the litigation known collectively as the Sugar Cases.'
Sometime in 1969, following consumers' complaints of producers' refusals to sell,' the Commission of the European Communities
began investigating the marketing of sugar within the EEC.3 Upon
completion of its investigation the Commission charged, on May
31, 1972, that the 22'sugar producing and marketing organizations
controlling 90 percent of EEC sugar production had engaged in
practices which violated articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome. 4
More particularly, the Commission charged that the companies
had violated article 85(1) by "concerted practices [which] consis1. Cooperative Vereniging "Suiker Unie" UA v. Commission, [1975 Transfer
Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8334, at 7903, 17 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 295
(1975).

2. Opinion of the Advocate General, id. at 8285, 17 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 304.
The ostensible reason for the refusals was that "available supplies were reserved
for the national market." Commission Decision on proceedings under articles 85
and 86 of the EEC Treaty, [1973-1975 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
9570, at 9251-57, 9258, 12 Comm. Mkt. L.R. D65, D76 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as Commission Decision]. In addition to the complaints noted in the text, the
Commission's attention was attracted by (a) the investigation of the German
Federal Cartel Office into an alleged grouping of German sugar producers, (b) an
agreement among French sugar manufacturers notified to the Commission on
October 31, 1968, and (c) an alleged sugar price war and an agreement for mutual
cooperation among sugar producers in the Netherlands. [1975 Transfer Binder]
COMm. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8334, at 8285, 17 Comm. Mkt. L.R., at 304.
3. The investigation was initiated pursuant to the Commission's authority
under EEC Regulation 17. 1 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 2422 (1972).
4. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, done Mar. 25,
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3 (1958) [hereinafter cited as EEC Treaty].
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ted mainly of: (i) consigning sugar directly to the sugar producers
of countries in short supply, or (ii) refusing to consign to buyers
other than these producers, or (iii) consigning sugar to other buyers
in those countries but with express authorization of the national
producers or with increased prices." 5 In addition, the Commission
alleged that several of the companies had "abused dominant positions" in the marketing of sugar, a violation of article 86.6 The
companies responded to these allegations with both general and
specific denials. In addition, they defended on the ground that the
production and marketing of sugar was so thoroughly regulated
within the Common Market that their actions were mandated by
regulations or, alternatively, that their actions could not have negatively affected competition because existing regulations left no
room for competition. The Sugar Cases are important because they
represent "the first time . . . [the Commission] had to deal...
with the application of the rules of competition in the Treaty to
the production of and trade in an agricultural product. . . which
is covered by a common organization of the market" (i.e., by another section of the Treaty).7
In addition to regulation at the community level, sugar marketing is also regulated at the national level, and the sugar companies
alleged that national regulation in Italy had led to the behavior
that eliminated competition in sugar marketing.' To those familiar
with United States antitrust law this line of defense will bring to
mind the closely analogous doctrine of Parker v. Brown9 in which
the United States Supreme Court held that the Sherman Act does
not apply to practices required by state action. This first appearance of the Parkerv. Brown defense in EEC competition jurisprudence demands close analysis.
5. Commission Decision, supra note 2, at 9252, 12 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at D76D77.
6. Commission Decision, supra note 2, at 9273-76.
7. [1975 Transfer Binder] Com. MKT. REP. (CCH)
8334, at 8286, 17
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 306. Although the Court dealt with trade in citrus fruits,
apples, and pears, for which a common organization existed, in Nederlandse
Vereniging voor Fruit v. Commission, [1975 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP.
(CCH) 8285, 16 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 123 (1975), there was no connection alleged
between the common organization and the rules on competition. See id. at 7279,
16 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 138.
8. Conflicts between national law and the EEC treaty provisions are to be
resolved in favor of the latter. See Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt, [1967-1970
Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
8056, 8 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 100
(1969).
9. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
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THE SUGAR CASES

A.

Background

To understand the Sugar Cases, it is necessary to first briefly
examine the EEC sugar market. During the four marketing years0
involved in the litigation-1968/69 to 1971/72-total production of
white sugar within the Community rose from 6.8 million metric
tons to 8.1 million metric tons and consumption rose from 5.9
million metric tons to 6.5 million metric tons." Although the total
market registered a surplus, individual countries did not. France
and Belgium were surplus producers, but the Netherlands, Germany, and Italy were deficit areas. This situation and the fact that
sugar is a standardized commodity should have insured a generally
competitive environment for sugar with trade flowing from west to
east. The consequences of such competition would have been
borne, however, by the growers of sugar beets were it not for government action to insulate growers from market price determinations. Such government action has been a characteristic of continental agricultural policies since the time of Napoleon I.
1. The Common Market Organization for Sugar.-The EEC
system for the protection of sugar beet growers is outlined in Regulation 1009/67, which entered into force July 1, 1968.13 The system
provides for the annual setting of an "intervention price" for white
sugar (art. 2).11 From this intervention price, the Council of Ministers calculates backward to determine a schedule of minimum
prices for sugar beets (art. 4).15 Sugar manufacturers must pay no
10. "Sugar marketing years commence on July 1 in the first year quoted and
end on June 30 in the next." Commission Decision, supranote 2, at 9253 n.2, 12
Comm. Mkt. L.R. at D69.
11,

[1975 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)

8334, at 8288, 17

Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 308.
12. "The Commission takes the view that the Italian market, because it has
a sugar deficit, was destined to become the main theatre of competition between
producers of countries having a sugar surplus." Submissions on the substance of
the case, Summary of the Statements of Defense, [1975 Transfer Binder] CoMm.
MKT. REP. (CCH)
8334, at 7962.
13. 10 J.O. COMM. EuR. 308/1 (1967), 1 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 711, at 745
(1973). The regulation was an attempt to "reconcile . . . contradictory objectives." [1975 Transfer Binder] CoMm. MKT. REP. (CCH)
8334, at 8288, 17
Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 308.
14. See 1 CoMM. MaT. REP. (CCH) 711B, at 748. The intervention price is
initially determined for the EEC area having the largest surplus production. This
area is in the north of France.
15. See 1 Comm. MKT. REP. (CCH) 711D, at 748. The reason for the back-
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less than the specified price when purchasing beets for processing
into sugar (art. 5).1 In turn, "intervention agencies" stand ready
to purchase sugar from the manufacturers at the intervention price
(art. 9).17 The intervention agencies may resell only at prices higher
than the intervention price (art. 10). '1 Regulation 1009/67 is
unique 9 among EEC agricultural regulations because, in addition
to this structure of price supports, it provides for production quotas. National quotas for white sugar production are established
with the stipulation that these are to be allocated to "each factory
or each enterprise producing sugar" on the basis of an historic
percentage of the national production (art. 23).2o Sugar produced
in excess of annual quotas may not be sold on the domestic (EEC)
market (art. 25).1
ward calculation is that beets themselves are not traded, but are grown and
delivered under long term contracts to sugar producers. The formula for the
calculation is intervention price minus figures for the processing margin, the
yield, the income of the factories or enterprises from the sale of molasses, and any
costs incurred for delivery of sugar beets to the factories. Reg. 1009/67, art. 4(2),
10 J.O. CoMm. EuR. 308/1 (1967), 1 CoMm. MKT. REP. (CCH) 715 at 749. One of
the reasons why sugar beets are not traded is that they are "highly perishable."
Norton, The Heart of the Matter: U.K. and the EEC, the,Problemof Agriculture,
6 TEx. INT'L L.J. 221, 232 (1971).
16. See 1 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 711E, at 749.
17. See id. 711J, at 750.
18. See id. 711K, at 751.
19. [1975 Transfer Binder] CoMm. MKT. REP. (CCH)
8334, at 8292, 17
Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 313. The quota system was supposed to terminate on July
1, 1975, but has been extended.
20. The precise formula is "the average annual sugar production of the factory
...for the marketing years 1961-62 through 1965-66" times a factor, the numerator of which is the Member States' quota and the denominator the Member
States' average production for the same marketing years. Denmark, Ireland and
the U.K. are permitted to use the marketing years ,1965-66 through 1969-70. Reg.
1009/67, art. 23(1), 10 J.O. Comm.EUR. 308/1 (1967), 1 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
711Y, at 759.
21. There are actually two quotas-the basic quota and the maximum quota.
Sugar sold in excess of the basic quota but within the maximum quota is subject
to a production levy. It is sugar produced in excess of the maximum quota which
may not be disposed of on the domestic market. [1975 Transfer Binder] CoMM.
MKT.REP. (CCH) 8334, at 8151, 17 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 403. See Reg. 1009/67,
art. 25(1), 10 J.O. COMM. EUR.308/1 (1967), 1 Comm. MKT. RFP.(CCH) 712, at
760. Up to 60% of the production levy can be passed back to the beet growers;
the manufacturers bear the other 40%. In fact production beyond the basic quota
is the norm in countries other than Italy despite the need for paying the production levy. [1975 Transfer Binder] CoMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8334, at 8293. See
Reg. 1009/67, art. 27(1), (4), 10 J.O. COMM. EuR. 308/1 (1967), 1 Comm.MKT. REP.
(CCH) 712B, at 761.
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Contrary to what might be expected, the production quotas have
had little effect on the patterns of sugar marketing within the EEC
because the quotas are fixed at a high level (ten percent above
estimated human consumption) .12 The actual purpose of the production quotas appears to have been to restrain an increase in
French and Belgian beet production expected to result from the
setting of an initial intervention price above the then prevailing
sugar price in those two surplus producing countries. 23 Since the
total EEC production permitted under the quotas was more than
sufficient to satisfy demand in deficit areas, the quotas could not
affect the pattern of EEC trade in sugar.24 The high intervention
price," on the other hand, combined with the low weight-to-value
ratio of sugar could have resulted in surplus French and Belgian
production being sold to the intervention agencies, rather than
being exported to deficit areas such as Italy. The high intervention
price could thus have a minimizing effect on intra-Community
trade. 6 Although the price of sugar for the years in question remained close to the intervention price in the surplus countries, the
Commission, nonetheless, found that the common market in sugar
"impose[d] no restrictions on trade between Member States.",,
The Court of Justice supplied some reasons, lacking in the Coin22. [1975 Transfer Binder] CoMm. MKT. REP. (CCH)
8334, at 8293, 17
Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 314. The maximum quotas were fixed at 135% of the basic
quota for Germany, France, and Italy; 116% for Belgium and the Netherlands.
Reg. 1009/67, art. 24(2), 10 J.O. COMM. EUR. 308/1 (1967), 1 COMM. MKT. REP.
(CCH) 711Z, at 759.
23. 1 CoMm. MKT. REP. (CCH) 715, at 773. "[T]he sole aim [of the quotas
was to limit] the guarantee regarding prices and sales, and they are therefore not
a form of sharing out production between Member States." Commission Decision,
supra note 2, at 9278, 12 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at Dill.
24. While the Court noted that quotas "cut down the quantities which producers can sell in the Common Market," [1975 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT.
REP. (CCH) 8334, at 8151, it is not clear whether the Court means to imply that
this had a significant effect on competition.
25. [1975 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
8334, at 8291, 17
Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 312.
26. Id. at 8151, 8152, 8294, 17 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 316, 403. Despite the high
intervention price, however, little sugar was offered to the intervention agencies-even in the surplus countries of France and Belgium because producers
feared resales by the agencies. "[T]he intervention agencies were ... dangerous
potential competitors.

.

. ."

Id. at 8292, 17 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 313. Thus, the

producers' reaction to a surplus was to withhold sugar from the market, including
the intervention agencies. This was possible because sugar is a product that
"keeps well." Id. at 8291, 17 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 312.
27. Commission Decision, supra note 2, at 9258.
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mission's opinion, to explain this. The Court suggested that while
regulation 1009/67 might have a chilling effect on intraCommunity trade because of the intervention price mechanism, it
also provided for the general "disappearance of intra-Community
barriers" to sugar trading.28 Moreover, the Court pointed out that
the common organization had "no appreciable effect" on areas
affecting competition, such as "volume of demand and conditions
of sale.""9 Finally, it was noted that the Community system provided for price floors but did not preclude the possibility of price
competition. 0 On the last point the Court added that "there is a
good deal of evidence . . . [that] the sale price . . . was the

subject of tough negotiations.""1 Nonetheless, the Court, unlike the
Commission, found that the common organization of the market
left only a residual field of competition. 2
2. The ItalianRegulations.-During the period with which the
litigation is concerned, maximum sugar prices in Italy were set by
a government body-the Interdepartmental Committee on Prices
(Comitato Interministerialedei Prezzi or CIP). The price was computed by adding to the EEC-derived intervention price for Italy
components representing various distributing and marketing
costs.M The price also incorporated an excise tax (sovrapprezzo) of

23 lira per kilogram, the proceeds from which Were to fund various
aid programs for sugar beet growers. 4 The addition of the full 23
lira levy to the price of foreign sugar would, however, have precluded all imports of sugar into Italy.35 To permit those imports
28. [1975 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id., 17 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 404.

8334, at 8152.

32. Id. at 8260, 17 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 410. But see id. at 8152, 17 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. at 404.
33. Order No. 1236 of Nov. 13, 1969, [1969] Gaz. Uff. 7106. The Italian

intervention price was approximately 5% higher than that for the rest of the EEC.
Commission Decision, supra note 2, at 9257, 12 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at D75. The

Italian Counsel d'Etat annulled the order fixing maximum prices on February 29,
1972. [1975 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8334, at 8157.
34. This sovraprezzo was supposed to equal "the difference between the current quotations in Italy and the new Community quotations. . . ." Order No.
1195 of June 22, 1968, [1968] Gaz. Uff. 4057, [1975 Transfer Binder] CoMm.
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8334, at 7911.
8334, at 8155, 17
35. [1975 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 407. This is apparently not completely correct because about
200,000 metric tons of sugar entered Italy during the four years in question after
the full amount of the sovraprezzo was paid.
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necessary to fill the gap between Italian production and consumption, a means was devised to ameliorate the effect of the levy. A
system of import quotas was established, and sugar importers were
invited to bid for the quotas. The bid represented a reduced
sovraprezzo.30 The bidders offering the highest sovraprezzo considered to be adequate (prezzo congrue) by the administrators of the
Sugar Equalization Fund (Cassa Conguaglio Zucchero) were
awarded the import quotas.
Certain rules of procedure limited the number of possible bidders. The minimum quota set for bids was 1000 metric tons. 7
Moreover, a performance bond "of a relatively high amount" had
to be posted by successful bidders. Quota holders were required to
import the full amount of their quotas or forfeit their security. In
practice, this meant that participants in the tender process had to
have firm offers in hand before bidding.38 Failure to comply with
all procedural rules resulted in a fine equivalent to the full amount
of the sovraprezzo. Furthermore, two external factors limited the
group of potential bidders: no industrial users had storage facilities
for more than a few days supply of sugar, and no sugar distribution
networks other than those of the Italian sugar producers existed in
Italy.39
The Italian sugar producers' group, representing virtually 100
36. See Order No. 1215 of May 21, 1969, [1969] Gaz. Uff. 3080. Between 1969
and 1972 the sovraprezzo varied from 6.4 to 11.5 lira per kilo. [1975 Transfer
Binder] CoM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8334, at 8310, 17 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 335.
37. The minutes of the Paris meeting of July 29, 1969, indicate that one participant "suggested that Eridania ...

can arrange with the Italian authorities

that the invitation to tender is only open to minimum tenders of 5000 metric tons,
which should eliminate quite a large number of firms." [1975 Transfer Binder]
CohiM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8334, at 8003.
38. Id. at 7961. There is some evidence that firm offers on price and quantity
were a legally required pre-condition of participation in the tender process. Even
after this was "reduced," it was alleged that the requirement remained as a result
of telephonic instructions from the Italian authorities. Id. at 7959-60.
39. The Italian producers explained their entry into distribution as a means
of lowering their overhead since their processing plants operated only part of the
year. Id. at 7949. This would have put them at a competitive advantage relative
to firms attempting to compete solely as distributors. The Commission said this
was not a substantial argument, however, since only about 25% of the imported
sugar was destined for consumption in its original state-the only circumstance
in which such a network was required. Moreover, the establishment of a distribution network does not present any special difficulties. During the years 1968-1972,
36% of all sugar imported into Italy was imported by importers other than refineries. Id. at 7959. This was cited as evidence that the establishment of distribution
systems within Italy was possible. Id. at 7971.
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per cent of domestic sugar production, was awarded 87.15 per cent
of the import quotas for 1969/70, 77.4 percent for 1970/71 and 60.77
per cent for 1971/72.0 "[The task of conducting the commercial
negotiations for each invitation to tender was assigned. . . to one
of the Italian producers, Eridania."' There was a similar concentration on the sellers' side, for all of the French and Belgian sugar
producers, who were the natural exporters to the Italian market
and who controlled 75 percent of French and 85 percent of Belgian
production, participated in the tender procedure through one
agent, Sucres et Denrees, a French sugar broker.2 In fact, the
Commission found that the tender procedure was by-passed by the
importers and exporters who negotiated contracts without regard
to the tender process and submitted the bids for import quotas
after the deals had already been made. In short, the tender procedure had little to do with the importation of sugar into Italy, or in
the more oblique language of the Commission, the "invitations to
tender [were unable] to play the part assigned to them."43
There was considerable evidence that the buying and selling
groups were in active cooperation. The Commission found that at
meetings in Paris on July 29, 1969, and in Genoa on September 11,
1969, the French and Belgian producers and the Italian buyers (1)
discussed measures to be taken to prevent "outsiders" from offering sugar for sale in the Italian market, and (2) agreed that sugar
would not be sold to Italian purchasers other than the Eridania
group except at prices boosted by a premium of 1.25 French francs
per 100 kilos for 1968/69, 1.65 francs for 1969/70, and 1.75 francs
for 1970/71. The Commission saw the collaboration among buyers,
collaboration among sellers, and collaboration between buyers and
sellers, as clear violations of article 85(1) of the Treaty, prohibiting
"all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of
undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the
Common Market."4 4
B.

Legal Issues

1. Regulation26.-A threshold question raised by the Commission finding was the extent to which article 85 applied to trade in
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 7984.
Opinion of the Advocate General, id. at 8311.
See id. at 7970.
Id. at 8157, 17 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 408.
1 CoMM. MKT. RaP. (CCH) 2005, at 1631.
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agricultural products. Article 42 of the Treaty left open the question of whether the "rules on competition shall apply to the production of and trade in agricultural products."45 Article 42 provides
that the rules will apply "only to the extent determined by the
Council. . . ." Clearly, the authors of the Treaty anticipated the
conflict between the organization of agricultural markets with a
view to maintaining producers' incomes and the preservation of
competitive marketing conditions. The traditional solution had
been a general exemption of agricultural marketing from antitrust
legislation." The Treaty did not go quite that far; it left the question open. The question was resolved by Council Regulation 26
(1962), which, rather surprisingly, stated that articles 85(1) and 86
apply to trade in all agricultural products. The general proposition
was subject to two exceptions. Articles 85 and 86 would not apply
to "agreements, decisions and practices" which (1) "form an integral part of a national market organization," or (2) "are necessary
for the attainment of the objectives set out in article 39 of the
Treaty [dealing with the general objectives of the common agricultural policy]. "' ' The sugar producers sought to invoke both exceptions to Regulation 26 as a defense to the Commission's charge that
their actions in marketing sugar in Italy violated article 85(1).
Analysis of the producers' argument that the Italian regulations
constitute a "national market organization" must begin with the
observation that that phrase is not defined in Regulation 26, nor
anywhere else in EEC jurisprudence. 8 The meaning of the phrase
must therefore be gleaned from those portions of the Treaty dealing with the scope of the common organization of the market. 9
Articles 39, 40, and 43 are particularly relevant. Article 39 provides
the general objectives of the common market agricultural policy:
(1) to increase agricultural productivity; (2) to increase the earning
of farmers; (3) to stabilize markets; (4) to assure needed supplies;
45. Sugar could be termed a manufactured product. The agricultural aspect
of sugar production is beet growing. Thus, it could be argued that sugar marketing
should be subject to articles 85 and 86 in the same manner as any other industry.
46. See, e.g., Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 409 U.S. 289 (1973); 7
U.S.C. §§ 291-92 (1970); 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-17 (1970); 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1970).
47. 1 Comm. MKT. REP. (CCH) 935, at 952.
48. See Commission v. Luxembourg, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder] COMM.
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8028, at 7434, 4 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 58, 65-66 (1964).
49. See id. at 7433, 4 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 66, for a definition of the national
organization of the market.
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and (5) to ensure reasonable prices to the consumer." In working
to achieve these objectives, "account shall be taken" of the social
structure of the agriculture sector, the need for gradualism, and
the central role played by agriculture in the economics of the Member States. Presumably, a domestic program-like the one in
Italy-that has similar goals and that has "taken account of" the
cautionary factors identified in article 39, would be a national
market organization. This is confirmed by article 40(2), which indicates that the common organization of the markets is one that
seeks to achieve the goals outlined in article 39.51 The argument
would thus run as follows: If an EEC-wide regulation taking into
account the goals of article 39 would be a "common organization
of the market," an Italian regulation taking into account the same
goals would be a "national market organization."
The actual argument between the parties regarding the goals of
the Italian regulations was somewhat truncated. Naturally, the
producers argued for consistency with article 39 because the primary goal of the Italian regulations was to guarantee the employment and standard of living of the sugar beet growers. The Commission, on the other hand, argued that the central feature of the
Italian regulations was a uniform price system designed to protect
consumers, not to benefit producers. 52 The sugar producers had the
better arguments since regulations designed to protect consumers
also further one of the goals of article 39. Moreover, the sovraprezzo
revenues-an integral part of the Italian program-were designed
primarily to provide financial assistance to sugar beet growers.
Article 40(2) further states that a common organization "shall
take one of the following forms. . .(a) common rules on competition; (b) compulsory coordination of the various national market
organizations; [or] (c) a European market organization." The
importance of this provision for present purposes is that the form
of a national organization should be a domestic reflection of the
form of the common organization on the EEC level. Applying the
three possible forms of organization to the Italian case, it is readily
apparent that the third form is irrelevant. The first form could
apply only if there were rules relating explicitly to competition in
the sugar market; there were no such rules in Italy.5 3 Finally, for
50.

1 COMM.

51.

Id.

MKT. REP.

(CCH)

405, at 519.

411, at 523.

52. [1975 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8334, at 8010-11.
53. See argument of the Advocate General in Commission v. Luxembourg,
supra note 48 at 7434, 4 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 66. ("This last form [common rules
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the second form to apply, one would have to find "compulsory
coordination" of the sugar marketing organizations. This, of
course, is what the present litigation is all about. It could be
argued, however, that if the Italian regulations were so pervasive
that they left only a de minimus area for competition in the Italian
sugar market, the Italian government had exercised "compulsory
coordination" of the Italian market; and since compulsory coordination was a form of market organization, the exception to Regulation 26 should apply in this case.
Article 43 of the Treaty sheds some light, if only by negative
implication, on this question of what constitutes a national market
organization. 4 In particular, paragraph 3 of that article provides
that:
The Council may . . . replace the national market organization
by the common organization. . . if:
(a) the common organization offers Member States which are
opposed to this measure and which have an organization of their
own for the production in question equivalent safeguards for the
employment and standard of living of the producers concerned. ..
and
(b) such an organization ensures conditions for trade within the
Community similar to those existing in a national market.
This implies that an "organization," either common or national,
provides "safeguards . . . [for] producers" and deals with
"conditions for trade."5 5 The Italian regulations were clearly an
'organization" under these criteria.
The Commission argued, however, that even if the Italian regulations created a "national market organization," that organization ceased to exist on the day Regulation 1009/67 (creating the
common organization for sugar) entered into force. In the Commission's view, a common organization meeting the requirements of
article 43(3)(a) and (b), quoted above, a fortiori replaced the preexisting national organization. 6 For the Commission, a national
of competition] cannot, however, be called a market organization, since it obviously disregards the influences exercised by the world market. I believe, as does
the Commission, that a market organization providing effective protection for
producers is inconceivable without protective measures with respect to the outside world.")
54. 1 Comm. MKT. REP. (CCH) 425, at 528.
55. This is essentially the definition argued for by the Advocate General in
Commission v. Luxembourg, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder] Comm. MKT. REP.

(CCH) 8028, at 7433-34, 4 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 65-66.
56. [1975 Transfer Binder] CoMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)

8334, at 8010, 8017.
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organization could continue to exist only if the Commission affirmatively decided to keep that organization in force.5 7 In support of
its arguments, the Commission cited the decision in PublicProsecutor of Italy v. S.A.I.L., 58 in which the European Court of Justice
was called upon to consider the vitality of the Italian system for
milk distribution and, in particular, of milk distribution centers.
Council Regulation No. 804/68 provided for "the gradual establishment of a common market organization." The Regulation also provided, inter alia, that Italy could maintain the milk centers only
until December 31, 1969. The Court held that from the time the
Regulation was issued "the Community authority alone could decide on a temporary retention of any national organization. . . for
the products in question."59
The sugar producers attempted to distinguish S.A.I.L. on the
ground that in that case the regulation explicitly called for an end
to the milk distribution system, whereas in the present case, Regulation 1009/67 did not call for an end of the Italian organization of
the sugar market. Moreover, they argued that Regulation 1009/67
did not provide for a common organization of the market since it
contained features that were clearly intended to be transitional;
namely, production quotas that were to expire on July 1, 1975. The
producers sought to support this position by citing a paragraph in
the preamble to Regulation 1009/67, reading as follows: "The realization of a common market for sugar calls for the removal of all
obstacles to the free movement of the goods concerned at the internal frontiers of the Community.""0 The companies argued that
since barriers to trade in sugar (e.g., quotas) continued to exist
after its entry into force, the Regulation did not create a common
organization of the market at that time.'
57. The text of Regulation 1009/67 at article 45 lends some weight to the
Commission's argument, for it provides that "[i]n the event transitional measures are needed to facilitate the changeover ... such measures shall be issued
following the procedure .... ." 1 CoMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 712V, at 768. This

article can be interpreted as requiring affirmative action if departures are needed
from the system outlined in the regulation.
58. [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8178, at 8010.
59. Id. at 8392.
60. 1 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 711, at 746.
61. 1 CoMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 711, at 745. The producers also argued that
the existence of the Italian regulations proved that there was no free movement
of goods. They argued that Regulation 1009/67 did not even comply with article
43(3)(6) since conditions for trade within Italy were not the same as those within
the Community. Both of the arguments are, of course, circular because they
assume the vitality of the Italian regulations, precisely the point in dispute.
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Assuming for the purpose of analysis that the producers had the
better argument and that the Council's promulgation of Regulation 1009/67 did not alone bring an end to the Italian national
market organization for sugar, the Commission then argued that
particular features of the Italian market organization were in explicit conflict with Regulation 1009/67 and the Treaty and were,
therefore, void under article 189 of the Treaty which provides in
part: "[A] regulation shall have general application. It shall be
binding in its entirety, and directly applicable in all Member
States." 2 This provision-the EEC version of the "supremacy
clause" of the United States Constitution-has been interpreted as
prohibiting Member States
from adopting measures. . . that are designed to alter the scope of
that regulation or amend its provisions. . . .To the extent that the
Member States have transferred their legislative powers . . . to the
Community, in order to ensure a proper functioning of the common
agricultural market, they no longer have the power to enact normative provisions in this field. 3
The conflict between the two sets of regulations is readily apparent, for the Italian system is premised on the existence of import
quotas, which are generally prohibited within the EEC and explicitly prohibited for sugar by article 35(1) of Regulation No. 1009/67.
In addition, in Capolongo v. Azienda Agricola Maya64 the Court
held that if the proceeds were used to benefit the domestic product,
a surcharge like the sovraprezzo, although levied on domestic and
62, 2 Comm. MKT. REP. (CCH) 4902, at 4111.
63. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Oberelbe v. Bollmann, [1967-1970 Transfer
Binder] CoMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8098, at 8402, 9 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 141, 153
(1970).
In Costa v. E.N.E.L., [1961-1966 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
8023, at 7384, 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 425 (1964), the Court noted that by creating

the EEC,
the Member States, albeit within limited spheres, have restricted their
sovereign rights and created a body of law applicable both to their nationals
and themselves. The reception, within the laws of each Member State, of
provisions having a Community source ...has as a corollary the impossibility, for the Member States, to give preference to a unilateral and subsequent measure against a legal order accepted by them on a basis of reciprocity ....

Id. at 7390.
64. [1974 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8213, at 8891, 13
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 230 (1973). See also Reg. 1009/67, art. 20(2), 10 J.O. Comm.
EuR. (1967), COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 711V, at 758 (prohibiting taxes having
an effect equivalent to a customs duty).
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imported sugar, would be considered to have an effect equivalent
to that of a customs duty. Since the sovraprezzo was clearly intended to benefit the Italian beet and sugar producers, it fit this
description and was in manifest conflict with article 35(1) of the
Regulation as well as article 95 of the Treaty, which prohibits
discriminatory internal charges.15 Finally, there is the conflict between the policy of EEC target and intervention prices and the
ability of a state to set its own level of sugar prices.
The Court thus had three opportunities to dispose of the case on
EEC constitutional grounds. It could have determined (1) that the
Italian regulations did not constitute a national market organization within the meaning of Regulation 26, (2) that even if the
Italian regulations did constitute an organization, they were ipso
facto voided by the promulgation of the common organization for
sugar (Regulation 1009/67), or (3) that the Italian regulations were
in conflict with Regulation 1009/67, and, therefore, void under article 189 of the Treaty. The Court chose none of these routes. More
surprisingly, however, the Court did not even mention any of these
arguments in its opinion.
There are several possible explanations for this failure. First, it
is possible that the Court did not consider the present litigation to
be the proper instance for a discussion and resolution of these
questions. The Italian Government was not a party to the proceedings even though it had a central interest in these questions. The
Court may also have considered the explicit procedure for Commission challenges to state aids such as the sovraprezzo provided
by article 93 of the Treaty to be exclusive. Furthermore, article 169
of the Treaty provides, "If the Commission considers that a Member State has failed to fulfill an obligation under this Treaty, it
shall deliver a reasoned opinion on them after giving the State
concerned the opportunity to submit its observations.""6 The Court
may have read this provision as precluding a collateral attack on
the Italian regulations in the present litigation. A second possible
explanation for the Court's failure to deal with the relationship
between EEC rules and the Italian regulations is that the Court
believed that defendants had a right to rely upon the Italian regulations until they were officially found to be incompatible with the
65. See also EEC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 92(3), 1 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
2921, at 2121, (prohibits state aid "which distorts or threatens to distort competition"). On this issue see France v. Commission, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder]
CoMm. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8104, at 7148, 9 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 351 (1970).
66. 2 CoMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 4615, at 3821.
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EEC rules." For whatever reason, the Court assumed the continued vitality of the Italian regulations, and its opinion is an analysis
of the effect of those regulations on competition in the Italian sugar
market."
2. Effect on Competition.-Recall that the Commission
charged, inter alia, that the producers had engaged in "concerted
practices . . . which have as their object . . . prevention, restric'
tion or distortion of competition within the common market."
The Commission, therefore, believed that it need not prove an
effect on competition. In the Commission's view,
having produced evidence of cooperation capable of adversely affecting competition

. .

. [the Commission] does not have to prove

that, in the absence of such collaboration, there would have been on
the market real opportunities for competition. On the contrary, it
is for the undertakings to prove that the characteristics of the market exclude effective opportunities for competition, whatever form
it took (a situation which does not often arise), and that their conduct is explained by other reasons than the intention of adversely
affecting competition. (Emphasis added.)7"
This reading of article 85 was actually a bold attempt by the
Commission to expand the holding in the leading case of

Etablissements Consten and Grundig-Verkaufs GmbH v. EEC
Commission.7' In that case the Court condemned certain exclusive
distributorships as violations of article 85. The Court held that "for
purposes of applying Article 85, paragraph 1, it is not necessary to
67.

See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 601 (1976). ("Even if the

state program had been held unlawful, such a holding would not necessarily have
supported a claim that private individuals who had merely conformed their conduct to an invalid program had thereby violated the Sherman Act.")

The Commission commenced proceedings against Italy for the conflict with
EEC regulations on December 4, 1974.
68. The producers also argued that the second exception provided for in Regulation 26-that article 85 does not apply to agreements "necessary for attainment
of the objectives set out in article 39 of the Treaty"-applied. The companies
argued that such agreements and practices need not be shown to attain all of the
objectives outlined in article 39. The companies noted that in the present case

the questioned arrangements "were necessary in order to attain at least two of
the objectives mentioned in article 39, namely to stabilize markets . . . and to
" [1975 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT.
assure the availability of supplies ....

REP. (CCH) 8334, at 8016.
69. See note 7 supra.
70. [1975 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8334, at 7993.
71. [1961-1966 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8046, at 7618, 5
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 418 (1966).
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take into consideration the actual effects of an agreement where
its purpose is to prevent, restrict, or distort competition."7
The Court refused to extend the Grundig per se rule covering
''agreements" to the present case charging "concerted practices"
and, instead, ruled that article 85(1) required a showing that the
practices "restrict or distort competition to an appreciable extent." The "appreciable extent" language is taken from the opinion in Beguelin Import Co. v. G.L. Import S.A. 4 in which the Court
held that this was to be measured by reference to the "situation
• . . in the absence of the agreement. 75 In effect, the Court held
that the Commission should have begun by considering the competitive possibilities in the Italian sugar market.
In the Court's view, the competitive situation in the Italian market had to be judged against a standard of "normal" competition-the situation where supply, demand, and price are determined by market forces. In Italy both the supply and the price of
sugar were controlled by the Government. The available supply
was the sum of domestic production plus imports. The latter was
determined by Government import quotas." In addition, the Italian Government "substantially reduced the opportunities available" to fix a price on the basis of market forces. The Italian
government directly affected prices in two ways: first, it fixed a
maximum price for sugar sales, and secondly, it affected the price
of imports by "the proportion of the sovraprezzo paid by the successful tenderer", and even this had to be ratified by the CIP which
72. Id. at 7652, 5 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 473.
73. The Advocate General argued that an agreement with the object of an
adverse effect on competition was prohibited by article 85 without a showing that
it had such an effect, but that if a concerted practice was alleged, a negative effect
on competition must be established, citing Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. v.
Commission, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) T 8161, at
8001, 8036, 11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 557, 571-73 (1972), where he had made a similar
argument. [1975 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8334, at 8299, 17

Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 321. Alternatively, the Advocate General argued that the
object of the concerted practices must be to restrict or distort competition to an

appreciableextent. Id. at 8312, 17 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 337. The Court seems to
have decided upon a formula combining both views.
74. [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 81 (1971).

8149, at 7697,

75. Id. at 7704, 11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 96.
76.

[1975 Transfer Binder] COMM.

Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 411.
77.

Id.

MKT.

REP. (CCH)

8834, at 8160, 17
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fixed an "acceptable price" (prezzo congruo).8 The Court concluded that in the absence of market determinations of supply,
demand, and price, the area for competition was "to a great extent
fundamentally restricted." 79
Although perhaps accurate, the Court's statement regarding the
effect on competition is irrelevant. The issue before the Court was
not which theoretically possible areas of competition were foreclosed by Italian regulations, but which areas actually remained
open. The case did not concern the entire Italian sugar market, but
only the importation of sugar into Italy. More general considerations of price, supply, and demand are relevant only if they affect
the market for imports. Contrary to the impression that might be
gained by reading the judgment, the Commission did not ignore
these issues." The Commission, for example, did not allege that
the "concerted action" had an effect on price. 8' Rather, the Commission pointed out that even in the absence of price competition,
there could have been competition on the conditions of sale, 2 quality of sugar,8 3 and service to the buyers. 4 Nor did the Commission
78. The Italian regulations were designed to limit imports to the shortfall
between national production and demand, to harmonize the cost of national and
imported sugar, and "to keep prices in Italy at a uniform level and relatively low."
Id, at 8158, 17 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 409.
79. Id. at 8161, 17 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 441.
80. The Commission seems to have attempted the analysis suggested by the
Court in Beguelin: "[Tihe most important thing [sic] to be considered is the
nature of the products covered by the agreement, whether or not the quantity is
limited, the position and size of the licensor and the licensee on the relevant
market, whether the agreement stands alone or is one of a group of agreements
and ... whether exports or parallel imports are permitted.

. .

."

See note 75

supra. In fact, one commentator was surprised that the Commission was at such
pains to ensure an economic analysis of the case before ruling, in view of "the vast
array of documented anticompetitive practices." Note, Article 85 and European
Antitrust Litigation:A Search for Economic Balancing, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1275,
1293 (1975).

81. [1975 Transfer Binder] Comm.MKT. REP. (CCH) 8334, at 7967, 7997.
82. One of the Italian producers argued that "the United Nations have been
actively engaged for decades in producing standard clauses in agreements for
international trade." Id. at 7979.
83. The grades are determined by the degree to which sugar is refined. Grade
IV has never been produced in the EEC, grade I only in France. Most EEC sugar
is grade I and II. The trend is towards grade I. Commission Decision, supra note
2, at 9253, 12 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at D69. "The notices of the invitations to tender
which do not deal with caster sugar, that is to say sugar in the first category, deal
with sugar in the 'second and/or third category. . . .' The opportunity for compe" [1975 Transfer Binder]
tition with regard to quality is therefore proved ....
Comm.MKT.

REP. (CCH)

8334, at 7994.
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rely solely on this negative evidence. Instead, it referred to what it
considered onerous contract terms which it believed would not
have been accepted by Italian sugar purchasers but for the lack of
competition between suppliers. 5 The Commission pointed to
clauses whereby purchasers agreed that (1) "the quality is deemed
to have been noted, checked and accepted by you on delivery," (2)
"the weight declared in the delivery documents is deemed to have
been accepted by you," and (3) "even in the case of the sale of
products net weight, the. . . list price shall be applied to the gross
weight of the bags."8 Finally, the Commission pointed to the suspicious sales transactions between producers who were normally
competitors selling directly to distributors or consumers.87 The
Commission noted that this arrangement prevented the Italian
consumers from freely obtaining the sugar they need from foreign
suppliers. u8 The Court, however, said not one word in its opinion
on these points. Thus, the case did not turn on the failure to prove
an effect on competition, but instead, on the relationship between
the conduct of the defendants and the Italian regulations.
3. The Italian Regulations and Defendants' Conduct.-The
Commission began its analysis by noting that the Italian Government had apparently set up a competitive bidding system for sugar
import quotas. This was at least some evidence of the Government's wish to provide for competition in sugar imports. Thus, the
Commission had a difficult time understanding how "the invitations to tender, which by definition imply competition [could]
strangle it."9 The French and Belgian exporters, nonetheless,
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
In the

Id. at 7963.
Id. at 7996. See also id. at 7965.
[1975 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8334, at 7999.
Commission Decision, supra note 2, at 9267, 12 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at D92.
Commission Decision, supranote 2, at 9226, 12 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at D91.
Commission's opinion, "[t]his concerted practice consisted of the above-

mentioned Italian producers agreeing together to buy sugar directly from the
French, Belgian and German producers and then reselling it at the same prices

and on the same conditions of sale as sugar produced by domestic producers."
89.

[1975 Transfer Binder] Comm. MKT.

REP.

(CCH)

8334, at 7993. At one

point in the argument, some of the producers seemed to be saying that the competitive bidding system was irrelevant to how business was conducted in the sugar
trade.
No purchaser of goods spends time and money on inviting general and

informative bids, from the maximum number of vendors. This is what

happens in practice: The purchaser knows the average prices applied on the
market ....
If he finds ... a good producer who offers him an advantageous price ... he naturally buys from [that] producer.
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argued that in practice the system encouraged collaboration. They
asserted that the amounts put up for tender (50,000-170,000 metric
tons at a time) were too large for any single enterprise, and that
only a combination of the largest exporters could guarantee regular
bulk deliveries.
While the Commission did not respond directly to them, these
points must be considered against a more general background of
alleged collaboration in the European sugar trade. In the Commission's view there was one EEC-wide producers' cartel." The coordinating vehicle was the Common Market Commission of the European Committee of Sugar Producers (Comite European des Fabricants de Sucre).' The Common Market Commission was alleged
to have met in Munich on May 30, 1968, to plan for the entry into
force of Regulation No. 1009/67.2 At this meeting it was apparently
agreed to divide up the European market. The evidence before the
Commission of the European Communities established that the
principle used to divide up the market was "'pas de mouvements
de marchandises de pays a'pays, si ce n'est en concertation de
producteuret producteur' (no movement of goods from country to
country, save by concerted action between producer and producer)" or, as it was incorporated in telegraphic fashion, "'chacun
chez moi' (each in his own home).""3 The policy was implemented
by strictly confining sales to competitors, or to third parties only
with competitors' consent or at prices exceeding competitors'
prices. Moreover, in the instant case the Court affirmed the Commission's finding that many of the exporters involved in the Italian
market had engaged in concerted practices to limit competition in
sugar exports to other EEC markets. Even more relevant was the
finding that all of the parties to the present litigation had combined to defeat the EEC system of invitations to tender for refunds
on export of sugar to third countries. 4 In view of this background
it seems difficult to attribute collaboration among exporters with
Id. at 7989. Cf. George R. Whitten Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424
F.2d 25, 31 (1st Cir. 1970) ("when government acts under laws requiring competi-

tive bidding it signifies its intent to respond to the signals of a competitive market
....

1").

90. [1975 Transfer Binder] COMM.

MKT.

REP. (CCH) T 8334, at 8295, 17

Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 316-17.
91. Commission Decision, supra note 2, at 9258, 12 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at D76.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. [1975 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 484.

COMM.

MKT. REP. (CCH)

8334, at 8257, 17
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regard to the Italian market to the Italian requirements for bulk
tenders.
The Italian sugar importers had a wider array of arguments
justifying their combination. First, they argued that the system of
import quotas forced them to combine because "[i]f sugar undertakings had competed with each other at the invitations to tender,
a single one of them could have been awarded the entire quota
and, since this quota was fixed in advance, dictated the market
laws (sic) for meeting the entire national requirement." 5 The establishment of maximum prices makes this highly unlikely, however, since there would be no benefit in monopolization. The importers also argued that the large minimum bid forced collaboration. 6 The minimum bid was only 1,000 metric tons, however, and
the importers charged in the case each had roughly one third of a
market involving annual imports ranging from 100,000 to 450,000
metric tons. Moreover, the importers each marketed about 500,000
metric tons of sugar annually in Italy. 7 The importers also argued
that they had to combine to be able to bid on the large quantities
of sugar which the sellers had to offer. 8 This, of course, complements the sellers' claim that they had to combine to offer the large
quantities put up for tender. Finally, the producers claimed and
the Court found that (1) the Italian government "wanted and requested

. .

. [Italian producers] to.

.

. import.

. .

in a rational-

ized way" and "always pursued the fundamental objective of a
uniform price for the sugar processing industry," (2) that "a senior
Italian official" informed the suppliers "of the need to harmonize
supplies above and below the Franco-Italian frontier, in such a way
that a uniform price can be maintained on Italian territory," and
(3) that "the system of invitations to tender.

. .

was adopted as

a means of obtaining such a uniform price, thanks to the undertaking given by the principal Italian importer to maintain the said
uniform price."99
95. Id. at 8006.
96. Id. at 8159, 17 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 410.
97. Commission Decision, supra note 2, at 9254, 12 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at D71.
98. See note 96 supra.
8334, at 8158, 17
99. [1975 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 408. This was also explained as a defensive alignment to
counter otherwise weak bargaining power and a response to the earlier organization of suppliers. See id. at 7959, 7985. In the Commission's view article 85 did
not permit this defense. Id. at 7968. Moreover, the Commission views it as interesting that "producer-exporters ... make the opposite submission." Id. at 7994.
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In considering these arguments, the Commission's view of the
prevailing law was that the practices could only be justified if
made "indispensible" by the Italian regulations."' It is doubtful
that the evidence was sufficient to meet this standard. The Commission decided that it had not been met. The Court, on the other
hand, took a more relaxed view of the law. Initially, the Court
noted that the Commission's statement that the Italian regulations "'do not explain everything' is tantamount to an admission
that they at least explain certain aspects of the applicants' actions." The Court then noted that in its investigations of the
marketing of sugar in Italy, the Commission found that" 'the procedure . . . adopted at invitations to tender undoubtedly
encourages the concerted action by Italian producers to control all
imports.' " (Emphasis added.)'"' Finally, the Court referred to the
allegations that the Italian government "wanted and requested"
producers to import in a rationalized way and that a senior Italian
official informed the suppliers of the need to harmonize supplies.
This negative implication, and the Court's findings of encouragement, request, and need led it to conclude that the Italian regulations "had a determinative effect on some of the most important
aspects of the course of conduct of the undertakings concerned
which the Commission criticises, so that it appears that, had it not
been for these regulations . . . the cooperation . . . either would
not have taken place or would have assumed a form different from
that found to have existed by the Commission."'0 3 This, of course,
sounds like a "but for" test and would seem to insulate anticompetitive concerted action if it is merely "inspired" by the regulations. ' 4 What makes the Court's analysis even more startling is
100. Id. at 8011.
101. Id. at 8157-58, 17 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 408.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 8160, 17 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 410.
104. The Court's "but for" argument seems the mirror image of that attributed to the Commission by the Advocate General. According to the Advocate
General:
[T]he Commission has merely mentioned the "special measures taken by
the national authorities" without having ascertained their consequences. It
simply states that, if there had not been the concerted action to which it
objects, suppliers would have been able to sell freely on the Italian market
... not accompanied by any evidence ....

Id. at 8312, 17 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 338. "Without these sales between producers

.,. the sugar producers of the surplus countries . . . would sell their sugar
individually on the Italian market, deciding on the quantities, prices and market-
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its failure to discuss a connection between the Italian regulations
and the refusals to deal.
Recall that the Commission began its investigation of the sugar
industry because of allegations that sugar producers refused to sell
directly to users in other countries, but confined such inter-market
transactions to producer-to-producer sales. The Commission
proved that French and Belgian exporters had agreed not to sell
to Italian importers outside the Eridania group except at prices
increased by the surcharge indicated earlier.105 The Commission
found that the price increase was not justified by added distribution costs or commercial risks.0 ' In fact, the price discrimination
was not based on volume of purchases at all, but rather on membership in the Eridania group. Moreover, Eridania itself referred
to the surcharge as a "margin of security."'' 0 This surcharge to
non-cartel members was a clear violation of article 85(1) (d), which
explicitly prohibits the application of "dissimilar conditions to
equivalent transactions."
The Commission found that the refusal to deal was significant
since substantial industrial buyers, like the confectionary firms of
Molta aiid Alemagna, stood ready, able, and willing to buy.' 8 The
ing organizations themselves ... ." Commission Decision, supra note 2, at 9267,
12 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at D91.
105. The exporters argued that they were not charging non-producer buyers
more, but were giving buyers who resell a discount as compared with buyers who
are ultimate users-a universally accepted custom. The Italian producers argued
that their discount was justified by the need to maintain a distribution organization and sell throughout Italy at a uniform price. [1975 Transfer Binder] ComM.
MKT. REP. (CCH)
8334, at 7957. Alternatively, the producers denied this arrangement was ever implemented. Id. at 7987. But the Commission cited a telex
message from Sucres et Denrees to Eridania, dated October 2, 1970, which stated
that several industrial Italian consumers begged Sucres et Denrees to sell them
sugar and that Sucres et Denrees refused to sell and complied 100% with the rules
of the cartel game. Moreover, the Commission took the view that the agreement
did not have to be implemented. "As the concerted practice is a form of coordination which has not reached the stage where an agreement in the proper sense of
the word has been executed, indirect proof of the conduct by which this coordination was effected can be adduced." Id. at 7998.
106. Id. at 7969.
107. Id. at 7999. The Commission found that the surcharge "includes both a
distribution margin and a safety margin in favor of the Italian producers which
has been increased several times." Commission Decision, supra note 2, at 9267,
12 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at D92. Some of the producers claimed that the exclusive
dealing arrangement was forced upon them by the importers. [1975 Transfer
Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8334, at 7951.
108. Id. at 7966.
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refusal of the French and Belgian sugar producers to sell to buyers
other than the Italian producers falls within a well-developed line
of EEC cases. In Electric Massage Instruments' 9 and
Etablissements Consten S.A. v. EEC Commission"0 the Court
fashioned the equivalent of a per se rule with regard to vertical
exclusive dealing arrangements. While the Court in the instant
case distinguished these cases as applying to "agreements" rather
than "concerted action," that distinction is meaningful only with
regard to the groupings of exporters and producer-importers, but
not with regard to the relations between the two groups. Although
the refusal of the exporters to sell to Italian buyers other than the
Eridania group was clearly the product of an agreement fitting
within the Consten rule, the Court never explicitly dealt with this
issue. More importantly, it never attempted to show the relation
between the Italian Government regulations and this refusal to
deal. What seems readily apparent is that there was no relationship between the Italian regulations and the refusal to deal. The
practice was instead clearly related to the policy adopted by all the
major European sugar producers at the time the common organization of the market entered into force-the policy of chacun chez
moi (each in his own home).
Two further matters cast doubt on the correctness of the Court's
opinion. The defendants had argued that even if concerted action
took place, the result was beneficial since the combination of sugar
orders into large shipments enabled the Belgian and French exporters to obtain lower freight rates from the SNCF, the French
national railroad company."' The Court accepted this argument
noting that it was one of the advantages of collaboration. Even if
this were true, however, such a defense can only be raised under
paragraph 3 of article 85 and only if the arrangement has first been
"notified" to the Commission. 12 None of the "concerted practices"
were notified in this case, and any benefit to consumers that may
109. [1961-1966 Transfer Binder] COMM.

MKT.

REP. (CCH)

4 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 231 (1965).
110. See note 71 supra.
111. [1975 Transfer Binder] COMM. MxT. REP. (CCH)

8030, at 7452,

8334, at 7956. The

Commission denied that transport costs were an important item in the marketing

of sugar. Id. at 7967. But the Court found that "transport costs of sugar are
relatively high." Id. at 8151, 17 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 403. The Commission also

noted that "it is difficult to determine how different undertakings calculate costs
for transport (either as actual cost or on a lump-sum basis) ....

."

Commission

Decision, supra note 2, 9570, at 9257.
112. Regulation 17 of Article 4, 1 CoMM.

MKT.

REP. (CCH)

2431, at 1752.
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have resulted from these practices cannot properly be considered
by the Commission or the Court. The same considerations apply
to the Court's argument that collaboration in bidding for import
licenses would result in a lower sovraprezzo and, therefore, lower
sugar prices, whereas "competition relating to the amounts of the
'sovraprezzo' . . . was likely to increase a not inconsiderable item
of the cost price . . . -,,3 Curiously, the Court is saying that collaboration between sellers to minimize an Italian government tax
is permissible under the Treaty since it benefits consumers. This
is unrealistic since the companies, having collaborated to reduce
the sovraprezzo, would undoubtedly continue to collaborate to
maximize the price to consumers, thus ensuring that any reductions in cost were translated into additional profits rather than
lower prices. The Commission had dealt with this issue by stating
rather simply that "price competition in the long run always bene14
fits the consumer."'
C.

Stylistic Shortcomings in the Court's Opinion

In commenting upon the Sugar Cases, The Economist noted
that:

[T]he decision . . . rounds off a thoroughly miserable period for
the competition office in its dealings with the court ....
The galling thing is that it does not necessarily miss the5 main legal points
but that its briefs are too often badly prepared."
While a fair reading of the Commission opinion shows an almost
effortless leap from fact to conclusion in almost every instance,
The Economist criticism still seems wide of the mark, for the Commission's opinion stands like a paragon of lucid analysis when
compared with the treatment of the case by the Court.
That the Court's opinion is not a model of clarity has already
113. [1975 Transfer Binder] CoMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8334, at 8161, 17
Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 411. See producers' arguments, id. at 7950. In cases where
quotas were awarded to non-producers the percentage of the sovraprezzo paid has
been higher than that paid by the Italian producers. See id. at 7963. The producers answered that this was true because the successful non-producer bidders
were near the frontier and thus paid lower freight costs. Id. at 7988. The Commission rejoined, however, that "[tihe relevant factor is not whether the differences between the tenders submitted ...

by the ...

group and those submit-

ted by undertakings which are not members, are minimal or not but the absolute
similarity of the tenders made by members of the group." Id. at 8001.
114. Id. at 7969.
115. THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 20, 1975, at 30.
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been made apparent. Its opacity may in part be due to the effort
required to produce a judgment running 377 printed pages. In part
it may also be due to the numbered paragraph style of presentation, which turns each sentence into a separate paragraph with a
resulting impression not only of visual, but, more importantly, of
logical discontinuity. Moreover, the analyst working from the English language version of the judgment cannot help being aware that
the judgment was drafted in another language and translated into
English by one for whom English was not a native language. For
example, paragraph 50 of the Law part of the judgment reads:
"The Commission does not seriously deny that these regulations
as well as the way in which they have been implemented affected
the applicants' conduct to which exception is taken." What is the
meaning of "seriously" when modifying "deny"? Does this mean
the Commission did not challenge this conclusion, or that it challenged it but then conceded that there was an effect? Moreover,
in the search for the critical link between the Italian regulations
and the companies' conduct, is the word "affected"-connoting
the weakest of all possible connections-the word the Court really
meant to use? In any event, what the Court seems to be saying is
that the Commission does not challenge the fact that these regulations affected the applicants' conduct. The superfluous language
can only be attributed to poor translations. The same must be said
of constructions like the first two lines of paragraph 54 which read
as follows: "Finally the Commission has not refuted certain statements, which Eridania produced, partly as evidence upon which
it relies, namely, on the one hand . . . ." This lack of clarity in
style is not the most troublesome aspect of the decision. The various elements which tend to cloud understanding of the Court's
judgment serve to mask the major problem-the Court's failure to
adequately consider the import of the fact that it was introducing
a new defense to proceedings under articles 85 and 86.
D.

The Article 85 Test

Article 85 prohibits, inter alia, "practices . . . which . . .
[restrict] competition within the Common Market . . . ." To this
provision the Court added the word "appreciably," taken from its
opinion in Bguelin."6 Thus, the relevant legal test for this case
was whether the applicant's conduct appreciably impeded compe116. [1975 Transfer Binder] COMM.
Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 411.

MKT. REP.

(CCH)

8334, at 8161, 17
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tition. In applying this test in the usual case, the Court would look
at the actual and possible relationship between competitors. This
may be a kind of "before and after" analysis if the challenged
conduct is a new agreement or merger, or it may involve looking
at the possibility of new competitors entering the market. 7 The
Court may look beyond the conduct of the parties to "the nature
of the products covered by the agreement.""' This would involve
an examination of the extent to which the product lends itself to
competition. Relevant considerations would include the degree of
brand differentiation, the extent of patent protection, etc. The
Court in the Sugar Cases has proposed that this market analysis
be extended to another element affecting competition-the extent
of government intervention in the market. While this is unobjectionable in principle, in fact it calls for a much more difficult kind
of analysis. Considering how competitors behaved "before and
after" they embarked on a challenged course of conduct or gathering data on the reasonable likelihood of new competitors entering
the market is a manageable task. It is far more difficult, however,
to describe the competitive position in a market assuming that
long-standing government regulation of that market is absent. The
Court unconvincingly attempted to implement this kind of analysis by comparing the sugar market in Italy with the Court's simplistic model of "normal competition." ' 9
Resolution of the issue presented by the Italian regulations could
have been accomplished more easily by relying on Regulation 26.
Regulation 26 provides for the application of the EEC competition
rules to trade in agricultural products except, inter alia, when
there is a "national market organization." Resort to this regulation
would have required the Commission to determine whether the
Italian regulations constituted a "national market organization."
Although making this determination might present difficulties, as
indicated above, it is easier than determining the quantum of potential competition extinguished by government regulation. While
this analysis could have been used to resolve the present case, it
would not, however, be applicable if the goods in question were not
agricultural. Thus, it may well be that the Court sought to announce a doctrine of wider applicability by choosing not to resolve
117. See, e.g., Europemballage and Continental Can Co. v. EEC Commission, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8171.
118.

See note 75 supra.

119. [1975 Transfer Binder] CoMm.
Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 411.

MKT.

REP. (CCH)

8334, at 8160, 17
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the case on Regulation 26 grounds. Whatever the Court's motives,
legal advisors will certainly be uneasy for some time in attempting
to advise clients on whether proposed actions are within a field of
activity in which "the operation of the rules of competition . . . is
[not] . . . to a great extent fundamentally restricted in its

scope"' 20 by existing government regulations.
Even more troublesome, however, will be the analysis of the
relationship between the conduct of the parties and the government's regulations. The Commission described the requisite relationship as "indispensible.'' The Court apparently softened the
requirement by using terms like "affected," and "encourages,"
and by applying the "but for" test-i.e., "had it not been for
these regulations and their implementation, the cooperation
. . . either would have not taken place or would assume a [different] form ...

.122 Because this issue of causal connection has

been at the heart of the confusion in American courts attempting
to apply a similar defense in antitrust actions, the American cases
are particularly relevant to the Sugar Cases.
III.

A.

PARKER v. BROWN

The OriginalDoctrine

American courts have attempted to deal with a state action
exception to the antitrust laws for 30 years. In the leading case of
Parker v. Brown' 23 the Supreme Court considered the California
Agricultural Prorate Act,' which authorized the creation of programs compelling producers of various crops to remove up to 70 per
cent of their crop from the market. As outlined in the Court's
opinion, the scheme worked in the following manner. Upon petition by ten producers of a particular commodity in a production
zone, and after public hearings and findings that a program would
"conserve the agricultural wealth of the State," the State Agricultural Prorate Advisory Commission could authorize a program. If
a program was authorized, the State Director of Agriculture selcted, from among the growers in the region, a "program committee," whose job it was to develop a "proration marketing proId. at 8161, 17 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 411.
Id. at 8011.
Id. at 8160, 17 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 410.
317 U.S. 341 (1943).
Act of June 5, 1933, ch. 754, §§ 2000-2399, 1933 Cal. Stats. (current
version at CAL. AGRtc. CODE §§ 59501-60015 (West 1968)).
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
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gram." Following approval by the Commission, the program committee was authorized to administer the program. Such a program
was instituted for raisin producers in plaintiff's zone in 1940, and
the result was that up to 70 percent of plaintiff's raisin crop had
to be withheld from the market. Dissatisfied with the situation,
plaintiff sued the relevant California officials alleging, inter alia,
'
that the program violated the Sherman Act. 25
The State defended on three grounds. It argued first that the
Sherman Act spoke of "persons" and was not intended to encompass states.' 21 Second, it argued that the California Act paralleled
similar federal agriculture legislation that had explicitly been exempted from the operation of the antitrust laws and that by implication, the analogous state legislation was likewise exempt.In Finally, the State argued that the Sherman Act was not intended to
reach action by the states since, in the absence of a clear indication
to the contrary, the states retained full sovereignty to regulate
activity within their borders.'2
The Court held for the State because there was no indication
that the Sherman Act was meant to apply to "state action or
official action directed by a state. 12 9 This holding affirmed the
similar conclusion reached in the earlier cases of Lowenstein v.
Evans 3 ' and Olsen v. Smith."' The decision, therefore, came as no
great surprise, nor was it particularly controversial.3 2 But Parker
125. Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970). Plaintiff also argued
federal preemption and unlawful interference with interstate commerce. The Justice Department submitted an amicus brief arguing for the application of the
Sherman Act.
126. See New Mexico v. American Petrofino, Inc., 501 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1974)
(detailed analysis); Lowenstein v. Evans, 69 F. 908, 911 (4th Cir. 1895).

127.

317 U.S. at 368. See also P.

AREEDA, ANTITRUST

ANALYsis 116 (2d ed.

1974). The federal legislation was the Agricultural Marketing Agreements Act, 7
U.S.C. §§ 671-674 (1970). Section 691(d) of the Act explicitly exempted agreements made thereunder from the antitrust laws.
128. "In a dual system of government in which, under the Constitution, the
states are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from
their authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its officers
and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress." 317 U.S. at 351. The case
was argued as a preemption case. See Note, Parker v. Brown: A Preemption
Analysis, 84 YALE L.J. 1164, 1174 n.61 (1975).
129. 317 U.S. at 351.
130. 69 F. 908 (4th Cir. 1895).
131. 195 U.S. 332 (1904).
132. See Handler, Twenty-Fourth Annual Anti-Trust Review, 72 COLUM. L.
Rxv. 1, 6 (1972) ("The key to understanding Parker,in my view, is the realization
that there is nothing really new in Chief Justice Stone's decision.").
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v. Brown did, however, raise an interesting possibility: Suppose
the suit had been brought by a purchaser against a grower who
failed to perform because of the Prorate program. If the purchaser
alleged that the program was a violation of the Sherman Act, could
the seller defend on the basis of Parker v. Brown? That is, could a
private enterprise bring itself under the "state action" umbrella by
alleging, inter alia, that the enterprise was an "agent of state"?
The development of the doctrine since Parker v. Brown has involved the search for a test to determine whether and under what
133
circumstances a private enterprise can become a state agent.
B.

Subsequent Development of the Doctrine

Under the narrowest reading of the case, the Parker v. Brown
doctrine would be available to a defendant when behavior which
is the subject of an antitrust action is the product of a state program that is consistent with a federal program "of at least equal
dignity with the federal antitrust laws.' 1 34 The Parker Court noted
specifically that the California Agricultural Prorate Act established programs similar to those provided nationally by the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act, which was explicitly exempted
from federal antitrust legislation. 3 ' The difficulty with this narrow
reading of Parkerv. Brown is that the Court discussed the consistency of the federal and state programs in the context of the argument on federal preemption of the field of agricultural regulation,
133. See Slater, Antitrust and Government Action: A Formulafor Narrowing
Parkerv. Brown, 69 NW.U.L. REv. 71, 73 (1974); Note, State Action Exemption
from the Antitrust Laws, 50 B.U.L. REv. 393, 397 (1970) ("[IThe courts have
been particularly unsuccessful in framing general principles . .

").

134. Teply, Antitrust Immunity of State and Local GovernmentalAction, 48
TUL. L. REv. 272, 288 (1973). See also Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931,
937 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ("Parker v. Brown ... involves sovereign state regulatory
action which is consistent with federal national policy, i.e., the Agricultural Adjustment Act, enunciated by the national Congress, which is also the source of
federal antitrust policy."); Id. at 946 ("We think it is significant that in those
cases where the antitrust laws were held not to apply there was a national or state
policy of importance approximately equal to the antitrust laws involved."); P.
AMEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYsis, 57-58 (1967), discussed in Verkuil, State Action,
Due Process and Antitrust: Reflections on Parker v. Brown, 75 COLUM. L. Rv.
328, 343n.77 (1975). See also Jacobs, State Regulation and the FederalAntitrust
Laws, 25 CASE W. RES. L. Rv. 221, 247, 249 (1975) (Doctrine should be limited
to cases where "private enterprises [are] affirmatively and intentionally regulated by state law that is consistent with a federal policy that prevails over
antitrust policies").
135. See note 127 supra.
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and not in the context of a limitation on the general proposition
that the Sherman Act was not intended to apply to the states. 3"
An imaginative variation on the preemption theme has been
suggested in a recent law review note. " ' In the writers' view, the
limitation in Parker v. Brown does not require consistency with
federal policy in the area regulated by the state, but rather consistency between federal antitrust policy and the state regulation.
Federal antitrust policy has at least three goals-protecting consumers, preserving competitors and efficiently allocating resources. Action taken as a result of a state program that is consistent with one of these goals is protected by the rule of Parker v.
Brown. The difficulty with this reading is that the test is too easily
satisfied. One would be hard-pressed to find a state program whose
articulated purpose was not to achieve one of the aforementioned
goals. In application the test is too easily reduced to a requirement
that the state program be "for the benefit of the public," i.e., no
test at all.1 38 Moreover, a reading of Parker v. Brown that searches
for consistency with federal antitrust policy conflicts with the assumption in the case that the conduct at issue would clearly have
violated the Sherman Act if engaged in by private individuals. 3 '
136. See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 587n.15 (1976). See also
Handler, supra note 132, at 16; Jacobs, supra note 134, at 232 ("[Ihe opinion
did not dwell on this narrow point."); Simmons & Fornaciari, State Regulation
as anAntitrust Defense: An Analysis of the Parker v. Brown Doctrine, 43 U. CIN.
L. REV. 61, 65, 96 (1974). The only case which has accepted this interpretation of
Parkeris Hecht. That case did not, however, involve a conflict between a state
program and federal antitrust policy, but rather concerned a federal-federal conflict. See text at notes 162-163 infra. "This distinction is not without significance." New Mexico v. American Petrofina, Inc., 501 F.2d at 371 n.17 (9th Cir.
1974). For criticism of Hecht see Handler, supra note 132 at 16; Note, Of Raisins
and Regulation: The Revitalizationof Parker v. Brown, 10 WAKE FOREST L. REv.

567, 578 (1974).
137. See note 128 supra.
138. A showing of a public benefit will not usually be considered in a Sherman
Act case. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 497 F.2d 1, 6n.9 (4th Cir. 1974);
Pennsylvania W. & P. Co. v. Consolidated G., E.L. & P. Co., 184 F.2d 552, 559
(4th Cir. 1950). Nonetheless, the Fourth Circuit saw this as one of the critical
elements in the application of the Parkerdoctrine. The court found the public to
be the primary beneficiary of the regulation of lawyers through minimum fee
schedules despite "the fact that in some instances adherence to a suggested
minimum fee schedule is financially helpful to the individual attorney." After all,
the court noted, the raisin growers in Parker probably "received some spin-off
benefits ....

139.

."

497 F.2d at 10.

317 U.S. at 350. In Hecht the court noted that "the proper inquiry would

seem to be ... to what extent is the state action permissible as not contravening
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If we can eliminate from Parker v. Brown the requirement of a
parallel federal policy, the availability of the rule depends upon
the presence of immunizing "state action." In Parkerv. Brown the
Court noted that the California program "derived its authority and
its efficacy from the legislative command of the state and was not
' 40
intended to operate or become effective without that command.'
This language aptly described the California program, but as a
guide to future conduct, it was almost guaranteed to cause confusion in the federal courts. And so it has. Nor was the situation
aided by the Court distinguishing Parkerv. Brown from an earlier
the federal antitrust laws ...... 444 F.2d at 935. The most likely reading of this
test is that the inquiry is whether the conduct in question is outside the reach of
the antitrust laws because, even if engaged in by a private party, it would not be
a violation. This test might also be interpreted as requiring consistency with
federal antitrust policy. See note 128 supra.But the thrust of the Parkerdoctrine
seems to be that state action is beyond the reach of the Sherman Act because it
is the action of a state, not because it is consistent with the antitrust laws. See
Simmons and Fornaciari, supra note 136, at 96. See also Woods Exploration &
Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286, 1302 (5th Cir. 1971)
("We therefore think it incumbent upon this court to render both state regulatory
and federal antitrust goals complementary rather than mutually exclusive.").
For a proposed balancing test weighing the state's interest in regulation against
the value of preserving competition, see Slater, supra note 133, at 104, 108. This
approach, however, raises serious constitutional questions as well as questions
about its workability.
A recent article by Professor Verkuil suggests another approach to this case. See
note 134 supra. Professor Verkuil argues that, under the prevailing view, the
analysis of the compatibilty of state regulation with federal antitrust doctrine
requires an evaluation of the wisdom of State economic policies, a route which
the Court abandoned in 1937. Verkuil, supra note 134, at 334. Instead, Professor
Verkuil argues that "at the core of the Parker doctrine are higher policies of
federalism and judicial economic neutrality," and he concludes that the proper
role for federal courts is to ensure that state economic regulations comply with
procedural due process standards. Id. at 346, citing Silver v. New York Stock
Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963). If the state's procedures satisfy this requirement,
a federal court should only proceed with an antitrust case when it finds that the
state does not "have a pervasive regulatory scheme which will scrutinize the
challenged conduct and be able to enjoin conduct that is deemed offensive." Id.
at 349. The author terms this "a kind of state primary jurisdiction doctrine." Id.
at 347. See Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 409 U.S. 289 (1973). But see
Jacobs, supra note 134, at 250. Jacobs argues that offensive conduct that occurs
before a state regulatory body has reviewed it lacks "the essential element of
compulsion." Id. at 252. See Marnell v. United Parcel Service of America, Inc.,
260 F. Supp. 391 (N.D. Cal. 1966) (state primary jurisdiction rejected). See also
United States v. Morgan Drive Away, Inc., 1974-1 TADz CAS. (CCH) 74,888
(D.D.C. 1974).
140. 317 U.S. at 350.
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case, Northern Securities Co. v. U.S."' In that case two competing
railroads were merged into a single holding company, thus eliminating competition between the two. The merger was authorized
by state legislation. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court held that a
state may not immunize individuals from the reach of the Sherman Act. 42 Between the "legislative command" and "immunization of individuals" lay a good deal of territory that the Court
did not choose to explore in Parker v. Brown. Subsequent cases
have explored that territory with mixed results.'
1. Legislative Command.-An initial attempt to narrow the
unexplored terrain focused on the word "legislative" as used in
Parker v. Brown. In Marnell v. United Parcel Service,"44 plaintiff
alleged that defendant had charged discriminatory rates, belowcost rates, etc., in an attempt to monopolize the package delivery
business. Defendants argued, inter alia, that its rates were fixed
by the California Public Utilities Commission. The court held
Parker v. Brown inapplicable, in part because it read the case as
requiring that the requisite "command" emanate from the legislature and not from a state agency. Similarly, in Travelers Insurance
Co. v. Blue Cross," defendant utilized a hospital insurance contract specified by the Insurance Department of the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania. The court found Parkerinapplicable since it was
limited to cases where "the legislature . . . directs . . . [the utilization of] anticompetitive means to achieve a specific government
purpose."' 46 This distinction between a "legislative command" and
the "command" of a state agency seems strained at best.'4 7 Since
141. 193 U.S. 197" (1904). See Asheville Tobacco Bd. of Trade, Inc. v. Fed.
Trade Comm'n, 263 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1959).

142. 317 U.S. at 351. The Court's treatment of Northern Securities has been
termed "somewhat cryptic." Verkuil, supra note 134, at 333n.29. Another writer

has called it a careful qualification. See Donnem, Federal Antitrust Law Versus
Anticompetitive State Regulations, 39 A.B.A.

ANrmUST

L.J. 950, 960 (1970).

143. See 84 YAuE L.J., supra note 128, at 1173; Slater, supra note 133, at 73,
108. Professor Verkuil has noted that Parker "has atrophied over the years due
to inattention by the Supreme Court." Verkuil, supra note 134, at 331. Verkuil
notes that at the time of his article the only application of Parkerby the Supreme
Court was in Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384
(1951). Since Verkuil's article, the Court has had occasion to discuss Parkerin
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) and Cantor v. DetroitEdison
Co., 96 S. Ct. 3110 (1976).
144. 260 F. Supp. 391 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
145. 298 F. Supp. 1109 (W.D. Pa. 1969).

146. Id. at 1111.
147. See Simmons & Fornaciari, supra note 136 at 80, 85. They charge that
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states can only act through agents, when Congress decided not to
apply the Sherman Act to states, it must have intended to immunize agents of the state acting within the scope bf their authority.
Moreover, by creating a state agency the state legislature in effect
delegates a portion of its legislative authority to that body.
In the very recent case of Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar"' the
Supreme Court implicitly rejected the legislative command-state
agency command distinction. In considering whether the state
compelled adherence to minimum fee schedules, the Court began
by observing that
no Virginia statute . . .[requires] their activities; state law simply
does not refer to fees, leaving regulation of the profession to the
Virginia Supreme Court; although the Supreme Court's ethical
codes mention advisory fee schedules they do not direct either respondent to supply them or require the type of price floor which arose
from respondents' activities. 4
The clear implication of this language is that if the Virginia Supreme Court had directed or required the maintenence of minimum fee schedules, the Court would have considered such action
as the action of the state of Virginia for purposes of Parker v.
Brown. 110 At the same time, the Goldfarb Court opened the question of when a state agent is not a state agent. The Court, in its
discussion of Parker v. Brown, termed "[tjhe State Bar, a state
agency by law," but later noted that "[t]he fact that the State
Bar is a state agency for some limited purposes does not create an
antitrust shield. . ." " To say that a state bar association is not
a state agency for purposes of antitrust analysis is, of course, to
assume the conclusion. The Court cannot mean that the opinions
issued by the State Bar that compelled adherence to the minimum
fee schedules were ultra vires since the Court concedes that the
State Bar had the power to issue the opinions. Why was the State
Bar not a state agency? Goldfarb leaves this critical question unanthis interpretation distorts "the rationale of [Parker] to an unacceptable degree."
148. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
149. Id. at 790.
150. This has now been confirmed in Bates & O'Steen v. State Bar of Arizona,
45 U.S.L.W. 4895, 4998 (1977), where the Court indicated that "affirmative com-

mand of the Arizona Supreme Court" would constitute immunizing state action.
151. Id. at 791.
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swered.112 It was, however, answered in Cantor v. Detroit Edison
53

*Company.
2. State Agent.-Cantor involved a suit against a regulated
public utility whose free light bulb program was alleged by plaintiff, a light bulb retailer, to violate the Sherman Act. Defendant
sought to invoke Parker v. Brown arguing that the Michigan Public Service Commission approved the light bulb program and that
so long as that approval remained in effect, the company was
required to continue it. It is difficult to articulate precisely what
the case held. Although the majority found Parker v. Brown inapplicable, Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, provided various
reasons for this conclusion. Only three of his colleagues joined in
his opinion; the remaining two members of the majority, the Chief
Justice and Justice Blackmun, concurred in the result but disagreed with virtually everything the plurality said. Nowhere was
this disagreement clearer than on the question of what constitutes
a state agency for purposes of Parkerv. Brown. The Stevens opinion contains the astounding conclusion that "Chief Justice Stone
. . .carefully selected language which plainly limited the Court's
holding to official action taken by state officials."' 54 (The two concurring and three dissenting Justices disagreed with this conclusion.)
Justice Stevens reached his conclusion by following two paths.
In his opinion he incorporated an extensive analysis of the briefs
and arguments in Parker.But as Justice Stewart's dissent points
out, this "history" of one of the Court's decisions is not analogous
to the legislative history of a congressional enactment. The Court's
holding must be gleaned, except in "rare instances," from the four
corners of the opinion. 5 ' More importantly, Justice Stevens' analysis does not compel his conclusion, but, in fact, leaves the matter
open. Perhaps sensing this, Justice Stevens attempted to buttress
152. The district court opinion distinguished between activities of the State
Bar authorized by State law and those which were not. See Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar, 355 F. Supp. 491, 495-496 (E.D. Va. 1973).
153. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
154. 428 U.S. at 591 (footnote omitted). This conclusion is stunning since the
Court in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 96 S.Ct. 1817 (1976), decided less than two months before Cantor,had
noted that "Virginia is free to require whatever professional standards it wishes
of its pharmacists; it may subsidize them or protect them from competition in
other ways. Cf. Parkerv. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 ... (1943)." (Emphasis supplied.)
Id. at 1829, 1830.
155. 428 U.S. at 617.
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his conclusion by citing in a footnote thirteen references to state
action in Chief Justice Stone's opinion. Justice Stevens noted that
"[e]ach time his language was carefully chosen to apply only to
official action, as opposed to private action approved, supported,
or even directed by the State.1 151 Justice Stevens' references do

not, however, support his point. Two of his references, for example,
are simply to the term "state action," a phrase that is not necessarily limited to action by state officials. In fact, the distinction presented in the footnote is somewhat different than that in the text.
In the text Justice Stevens says that "state action" for purposes
of Parker v. Brown must be interpreted as limited "to official
action taken by state officials," but in his footnote he argues that
Chief Justice Stone distinguished between official action and private action approved, supported, or directed by the state.
The proposition to be tested, however, is whether Chief Justice
Stone's language is amenable to an interpretation that would convert a private action into state action by making a private party
an agent of the state. The quoted term, "state action," is surely
consistent with such an interpretation. Moreover, in items number
(2) and (3) quoted in Justice Stevens' footnote, Chief Justice Stone
refers to "a state or its officers or agents" and "a state's control
over its officers and agents." Is this the "carefully selected language which plainly limited the Court's holding to official action
taken by State officials"? If so, it is because "officers or agents"
or "officers and agents" can only mean "officials." Would it not
be equally permissible to believe that Chief Justice Stone meant
"officials and agents"? If so, is it inconceivable that a private party
may be made an agent of the state for certain purposes? It seems
hard to disagree with Justice Stewart's observation in dissent that
"[tihis view of Parker . . . would trivialize [sic] that case to the
point of overruling it . .
"157 Since four other Justices agreed

with Justice Stewart on this point, it seems safe to continue this
exposition of the Parker v. Brown doctrine on the assumption that
it is not available only to state officials.'58
156. Id. at 591 n.24.
157. Id. at 616.

158. The issues seem to have been reopened in Bates & O'Steen v. State Bar,
supra note 150, where after noting that "Cantor would have been an entirely
different case if the claim had been directed against a public official," the Court
went on to note that although the State Bar was the defendant, the "real party
in interest" was the Supreme Court of Arizona. The "real party in interest"
doctrine raises the possibility that where private parties act as agents of the state,
the state may be the real party in interest.
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3. Legislative Intent.-Recall that Travelers Insurance, supra,
read Parker v. Brown as requiring a situation where "the legislature . . . directs . . . [the utilization of] anticompetitive means

Some courts use language such as this, but, instead of
. . I"59
focusing solely on the word "legislature," consider the entire
phrase and, therefore, distinguish situations in which the legislature has delegated a general authority from those in which there
is an explicit legislative grant of authority to require a specific
anticompetitive act. This has come to be known as the "legislative
intent" test. Cantor validated this test. In drawing a distinction
between Parkerand Cantor the Court noted that in Parker"[t]he
express purpose of the program was to restrict competition among
the growers . . .," whereas "[t]he statute creating the Commis-

sion contains no direct reference to light bulbs." 6 ' While the latter
observation is true, the former seems open to question. For authority on the "express purpose" of the California program, Justice
Stevens cites not the California statutes, but the Court's language
in Parker.The statute itself says nothing about "restricting competition," but speaks instead of "correcting adverse marketing
conditions" and maintaining "purchasing power at an equitable
and reasonable level.""' ' Thus, the question is: How clear must a
state policy be before it is express? Or perhaps the inquiry should
be as to form, since clarity may be a function of form?
The CantorCourt should have studied the lower court cases that
attempted to articulate a legislative intent test before stepping out
onto that uncertain terrain. A recent example of this analysis is
Hecht v. Pro-Football,Inc.,"' in which a congressionally created
agency-the Armory Board-leased Kennedy Stadium for the exclusive use of the Washington Redskins. One rationale for finding
the Board in violation of the Sherman Act was that, although it
performed a governmental function, "it had not received a specific
delegation of authority to regulate by restraint of trade." ' 3 The
159. See note 146 supra.
160. 428 U.S. at 584, 585.
161. CAL. AGRic. CODE §§ 59542-46 (West 1968).
162. See note 134 supra.
163. Teply, supra note 134, at 297. See Note, Antitrust Immunity-Reevaluation and Synthesis of Parker v. Brown-Intent, State Action, Causation, 19
WAYNE L. REv. 1245, 1252 (1973) ("For Parker immunity ... it is first necessary
to find that the state intends to suspend the competitive principles of the
antitrust laws .

. . .")

(Citing Hecht). Although Hecht deals with a federal-

federal, rather than federal-state, conflict, the court deals with the case as one
governed by Parker v. Brown. See 444 F.2d at 936-38 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The
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clearest statement of the legislative intent test has been made by
the First Circuit in George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool
Builders, Inc."' There the court said, "Our reading of Parkerconvinces us that valid government action confers antitrust immunity
only when government determines that competition is not the
summum bonum in a particular field and deliberately attempts to
provide an alternate form of public regulation.1 16 5 How "specific"

the delegation, how clear the "determination," and how
"deliberate" the attempt need be, are not made clear in the cases.
Cantor has certainly not improved the situation.'6
4. State Compelled.-Before Cantor the focal point for analysis of Parker v. Brown was the word "command" in the phrase
"legislative command."'67 A new emphasis was given to this aspect
of Parker v. Brown in Goldfarb, in which the Court noted that the
Parker doctrine was only available when "anticompetitive activities

. .

.[are] compelled by the state acting as sovereign.' 6 8 The

Court noted that this was a threshold inquiry and that without a
showing of compulsion, there was no further need to analyze the
possible applicability of Parkerv. Brown.' 9 Since the compulsion
legislative mandate test was rejected in New Mexico v. American Petrofina,Inc.,
501 F.2d at 369-70. For the argument that Parker only applies where the legislature directs the anticompetitive act, see George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock
Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25, 30 (1st Cir. 1970); Marnell v. United Parcel
Service of America, Inc., 260 F. Supp. at 409-10; Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross,
298 F. Supp. at 1112. See also Asheville Tobacco Bd. of Trade v. Fed. Trade
Comm'n, 263 F.2d at 509 ("When a state has a public policy against free competition in an industry important to it ....
164. 424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1970).
165. 424 F.2d at 30. See also Comment, Whitten v. Paddock: The Sherman
Act and the "Government Action" Immunity Reconsidered, 71 COLUM. L. REV.
140, 144 (1971) ("The prorate program at issue [in Parker] . . .was specifically

directed by the state legislature. The statute ...

delineated the specific mea-

sures which the program committees could employ ...

.").

See text at note 161

supra.
166. The difficulties inherent in a legislative intent test are made clear in
Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion. 428 U.S. at 610-12.
167. See Asheville Tobacco Bd. of Trade v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 263 F.2d at
509. In Parker the Court uses the terms "directed," "commanded," and
"imposes." 317 U.S. at 350, 352.
168. 421 U.S. at 791. For an example of state anti-competitive activity where
the state was not operating in its sovereign capacity, see Reid v. University of
Minnesota, 107 F. Supp. 439 (N.D. Ohio 1952) (state university press). See also
Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 450 (1941); Ladue Local Lines,
Inc. v. Bi-State Dev. Agency, 433 F.2d 131 (8th Cir. 1970); Jacobs, supra note 134,
at 239; Slater, supra note 133, at 89-90.
169. While the Court had used the terms "directed," "commanded," and
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element has been made critical by Goldfarb, it may be worthwhile
to examine the Court's treatment of it in that case.
"imposed" in Parker v. Brown, lower courts occasionally found the requisite
degree of state involvement when the state "approved" or "authorized" private
conduct. See, e.g., Gas Light Co. of Columbus v. Georgia Power Ce., 440 F.2d
1135, 1140 (5th Cir. 1971) ("approved"). ("Defendant's conduct cannot be characterized as individual action when we consider the state's intimate involvement
with the rate-making process. Though the rates and practices originated with the
regulated utility, Georgia Power, the facts make it plain that they emerged from
the Commission as products of the Commission."). See also Washington Gas
Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1971) (the court
interpreted the silence of the state regulatory agency as approval). The court of
appeals in Goldfarb apparently reaffirmed its view in VirginiaElectric that State
silence implies consent. See Jacobs, supranote 134, at 234n.52. Some thin support
for this view might have been gleaned from Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide
and Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962). In that case a subsidiary of Union Carbide
(Electro Met) had been appointed by the Canadian government as its exclusive
purchasing agent for vanadium. In its purchases Electro Met was alleged to have
deliberately discriminated against Continental. While upholding the dismissal of
the treble damage action, the Court rejected the availability of the Parkerdefense
on the ground that while Electro Met acted "in a manner permitted by Canadian
law . . . [t]here [was] nothing to indicate that such law in any way compelled
discriminatory purchasing . . ." nor even that the Canadian government
"approved or would have approved of joint efforts to monopolize . ... Id. at

706, 707. The negative implication is that if compulsion or approval had been
present, a Sherman Act claim would not be made out. The case may be distinguishable on the ground that different considerations are involved when dealing
with the action of a foreign sovereign. But the Court never reached that point.
For a case holding that foreign sovereign compulsion is a defense in an antitrust
case, see InteramericanRefining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo Inc., 307 F. Supp.
1291, 1296, 1303 (D. Del. 1970). See also Note, Development of the Defense of
Sovereign Compulsion, 69 MICH. L. Rsv. 888 (1971).
Whatever the validity of the state approval concept, it seems to have been
ended by Goldfarb. In that case the County Bar argued that the promulgation of
minimum fee schedules had been "prompted" by the State. The Court explicitly
rejected this view. Instead it noted, "[T]he threshold inquiry

. . .

is whether the

activity is required by the state acting as sovereign. Here we need not inquire
further into the state action question because it cannot fairly be said that the
State of Virginia through its Supr6me Court Rules required the anticompetitive
activities of either respondent." 421 U.S. at 790. Despite the clarity of this holding, one sentence in the opinion leaves a nagging doubt. In the course of its
discussion of the lack of state involvement the Court noted that: "Although the
State Bar apparently has been granted the power to issue ethical opinions, there
is no indication in this record that the Virginia Supreme Court approves the
opinions." Id. The Court had already concluded that the Supreme Court was a
state agency for purposes of Parker v. Brown and the State Bar was not. Does
the sentence mean the case would have been different if the Supreme Court had
approved the opinions? Cantor seems to indicate approval would not be sufficient.
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The Supreme Court of Virginia adopted rules governing the conduct of the Bar. Several of those rules dealt with the question of
fees. Rule II, § 12 provided, inter alia, that in setting a fee, attorneys were to take into account "the customary charges of the Bar
for similar services."' 7 0 In doing so, the Rules noted that "it is
proper for a lawyer to consider a schedule of minimum fees
adopted by a Bar Association, but no lawyer shouldpermit himself
to be controlledthereby or tofollow it as his sole guide in determining the amount of his fee.' 7' The Code of Professional Responsibility adopted by the court in 1971 also dealt with fees. In particular,
the Code provided that "[s]uggested fee schedules . . . provide
some guidance on the subject of fees" and that "[t]he fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services" was a factor
to be considered "in avoiding an excessive fee." ' The Court notes
that despite the fact that the codes "mention advisory fee schedules they do not direct either respondent [State Bar Association]
to supply them .
"173 While it could be argued that the codes
presupposed the existence of minimum fee schedules, the Court
sought an explicit direction to promulgate minimum fee schedules.
This may represent a more restricted view of the requisite state
command than was present in Parker. In Parker v. Brown the
prorate scheme was initiated by filing a petition signed by ten
growers. After a program was authorized by the state, it was developed by a committee of growers, but the growers were not
"compelled" to file a petition. Nor were they "compelled" to develop a program after state authorization. "[B]ut for" both of
those events, there would be no program. Was this then a case
where participation in an anticompetitive program was
compelled? Applying the Goldfarb reasoning, the response must be
negative, since California did not "compel" the bringing into existence of a prorate scheme any more than Virginia compelled the
issuance of minimum fee schedules.'
Cantorattempted to clarify the compulsion issue emphasized in
Goldfarb. The Court assumed arguendo that Parker would be
170. 421 U.S. at 789 n.19.
171. Id. (emphasis supplied by the Court).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 790.
174. Once the programs were established, California "compelled" compliance
by making non-compliance a criminal offense, 317 U.S. at 347, while Virginia
made "habitual disregard of fee schedules" grounds for professional discipline,
421 U.S. at 791n.21.
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available to a party "who had done nothing more than obey a state
175
command," because the alternative would have been "unjust."
The Court then went on to state that such a situation would rarely
occur since "typically cases of this kind involve a blend of private
and public decision making." ' And in a footnote, the Court seems
to say that even Parkeritself could not meet the "unjust" standard
because of the private participation in the prorate scheme. 77 To
further illustrate its meaning, the Court referred to Schwegmann
Brothers v. Calvert Distillers Corp., ' the only case prior to
Goldfarb in which the Supreme Court discussed Parker.
Schwegmann dealt with the legality, under the Miller-Tydings
Act, of the so-called "non-signers clause," a provision of Louisiana
law which provided that if one retailer signed an agreement with
a dealer agreeing to a fixed retail price, all other retailers of the
product were bound by that "fair trade" agreement. In a suit alleging that this was a price-fixing scheme in violation of the Sherman
Act, the Parkerdoctrine was raised in defense.7 9 It was alleged that
a non-signer was bound to maintain the fair trade price under
Louisiana law in exactly the same way that the nonconsenting
raisin grower in California was bound to withhold a portion of his
crop from market under California law. The Court was not persuaded by the analogy and did not even discuss this aspect of the
case. The Court only mentioned Parkerv. Brown in observing that
the Miller-Tydings Act did not cover "horizontal" price fixing.
"Therefore," continued the Court, "when a State compels retailers
to follow a parallel price policy, it demands private conduct which
the Sherman Act forbids."'' 0 On its face this language could be
read as overruling Parker v. Brown since that case assumed that
the challenged conduct, if engaged in by private parties, would
have violated "the Sherman Act and it was only the fact that it
was 'commanded' by the State which took it beyond the reach of
that Act."
Cantor tells us that when the Court in Schwegmann characterized the Louisiana statute as "compel[ling] retailers," the compulsion was not so great as to be "unjust" since "the private party
exercised sufficient freedom of choice to enable the Court to con175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

428 U.S. at 592, 593.
Id. at 592.
Id. at 593 n.29.
341 U.S. 384 (1951).
341 U.S. at 386.
Id. at 389.
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clude that he should be held responsible for the consequence of his
decision.""' Thus, with one simple stroke, the Court reconciled
Schwegmann and Parker,a task that had troubled commentators
for years.'82 The price of this housekeeping, however, was the destruction of the Parkerdoctrine. Actually, the major damage had
been done when the Cantor Court concluded that Parkerv. Brown
applied only to state officials. Since states are not in the habit of
"compelling" or "commanding" their officials to act, there will be
little future need to discuss this question, which Goldfarb had
termed the threshold issue in a Parker v. Brown analysis. This
must be further examined, however,- since a majority of justices did
not agree that Parkerv. Brown applied only to state officials, and
the Court left open that rare possibility "where the State's participation in a decision is so dominant that it would be unfair to hold
a private party responsible. . ...
181.

428 U.S. at 593.

182. Justice Blackmun read Schwegmann as a straight preemption case. Id.
at 606. The three dissenting Justices read Schwegmann as a Court interpretation
of the congressional intent expressed in the Miller-Tydings Act. Id. at 637n.25,
639n.27. Moreover, the dissenters point out that the Court misread the congressional intent since Schwegmann was legislatively overruled by the McGuire Act.
Id. at 637 n.25.
Earlier attempts by legal scholars to distinguish Parker and Schwegmann
pointed out that in Parkerv. Brown the state legislation is consistent with federal
legislation manifesting a congressional intent not to apply the antitrust laws in
this area whereas in Schwegmann there was no such parallel federal policy. See
Donnem, Federal Antitrust Law Versus Anticompetitive State Regulations, 39
A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 950 (1970).
Other commentators have distinguished the two cases on the ground that in
Schwegmann the state played a more passive role in the program than did California in Parker. In Schwegmann the price maintenance contracts were negotiated without state supervision. In Parker, on the other hand, interested parties
had to petition a state agency for a program, the hearings were conducted under
state auspices, and the program was implemented after approval by a state official. Moreover, the program in Parkerwas supported with state funds. See, e.g.,
Simmons & Fornaciari, supra note 136, at 67. ("In Schwegmann, state compulsion occurred only by the most circuitous of routes. . . ."). These commentators,

like the Court in Cantor, see Schwegmann as a case in which Louisiana merely
permitted non-signer clauses, but did not compel their insertion as a condition
of doing business in Louisiana. It has been suggested that the anticompetitive
acts in Parker (i.e., production and marketing quotas) are less inconsistent with
federal antitrust policy than are the price-fixing agreements in Schwegmann. Id.
at 68. This ignores the fact that production and marketing restrictions are a
method of price-fixing.
183. 428 U.S. at 594-95. In the recent case of Bates & O'Steen v. State Bar,
supra note 150, at 4898, the Court again reopened the "affirmative command"
issue and found it present.
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5. State ParticipationThrough Supervision.-Detroit Edison's
argument in Cantor was apparently based upon Goldfarb as well
as the Fourth Circuit decision in Washington Gas Light Co. v.
Virginia Electric and Power Co."8 4 The latter case involved a conflict between utilities supplying competing sources of energy for
domestic use. Plaintiff gas company alleged that defendant made
use of illegal tying arrangements to induce builders to provide for
electric rather than gas fuel. The Fourth Circuit permitted the
Parker defense because defendant's "activities . . . [fell] under
state supervision" and were "within the ambit of [state] regulation."'' The Court was severely criticized for this decision because
it substituted8 state "approval" for the Parker requirement of
"command."' Likewise, in Goldfarb the Fourth Circuit permitted
the invocation of Parkerin a case in which "the regulation of the
industry was actively and continually supervised by the State
... ,,"The Supreme Court's reversal of Goldfarb and its emphasis on "compulsion" were presumably designed to bring home
to the Fourth Circuit the error of its ways. To provide the compulsion element in Cantor, Detroit Edison argued that once its free
184. 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1971).
185. 438 F.2d at 252. The "active supervision" test for state involvement is
relied upon in Asheville Tobacco Bd. of Trade, 263 F.2d at 509, and in Goldfarb,
497 F.2d at 6. It is criticized in Simmons & Fornaciari, supra note 136 at 68, 89.
186. This decision is criticized in Int'l Tel. & Tel. v. General Tel. & Elec.
Corp., 351 F. Supp. 1153, 1203n.129 (D. Hawaii 1972) ("an unwarranted hyperextension of Parker"); Jacobs, supra note 134, at 234 ("stretches Parker to the
breaking point"); Kinter & Kaufman, The State Action Antitrust Immunity
Defense, 23 AM. L. REV. 527, 530-33 (1974); Note, Noerr-Penningtonand Parker
Defenses Inapplicable to Filing of False Information with State Regulatory
Commission, 46 TuL. L. REv. 526, 530 & n.29 (1972); 13 WM. & MARY L. REV. 229,
230-31 (1971). For a defense of a decision on the theory that the Parkerdefense is
available whenever the State regulatory program "would have survived substantive due process challenge on economic grounds," see Verkuil, supra note 134, at
339. This reduces itself to a per se rule where state public utility regulation is
involved. Id. For the suggestion that the "active supervision" test would have
resulted in liability in Continental Ore, see Simmons & Fornaciari, supra note
136, at 89.
There is a strong element of primary jurisdiction philosophy in the Washington
Gas Light decision. The court notes that "the gas company concedes that the SCC
possessed adequate regulatory power to stop VEPCO. . .and finally ended the
promotional practices upon which the suit is based. The antitrust laws are a poor
substitute, we think, for plaintiff's failure to promptly protest to the SCC. ..."
438 F.2d at 252. See also CSI/Communication Systems, Inc. v. South Central Bell
Tel. Co., 346 F. Supp. 487 (E.D. Tenn. 1971).
187. 497 F.2d at 6.
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light bulb program became a part of its tariff and that tariff was
declared effective by the Michigan Public Service Commission,
Detroit Edison could not abandon the program without violating
State law.'88 Even under the pre-Cantor interpretations of Parker
v. Brown this was a weak argument.
The Court could have disposed of Cantor even under the reasoning of the much-criticized Washington Gas Light case, for in
Cantor Michigan's regulatory interest was clearly in the distribution of electricity, not the distribution of light bulbs. Without
countenancing a strict legislative intent test, it would seem reasonable for the Court to have held that Michigan's "active supervision" of Detroit Edison extended only to the distribution of electricity, not the distribution of light bulbs."8 9 In fact, "the Commission ha[d] never made any specific investigation of the light bulb
market."'' 0 The Court was wise to stay out of the "active supervision" thicket since it is unsupported by Parker and would have
widened the potential area for invocation of the Parkerdoctrine. 9 '
The Court could have decided Cantor more easily and could
have maintained perfect consistency with Goldfarb, by basing its
decision on the absence of the requisite compulsion. Unlike Farmer
Brown in Parker and the non-signing liquor retailer in
Schwegmann, Detroit Edison could have abandoned the free light
bulb program at any time by filing an appropriate petition with
the Michigan Public Service Commission. There was no evidence
that the State or the Public Service Commission desired that this
program continue; they were indifferent, as evidenced by the fact
that other utilities regulated by the Commission did not have a
free light bulb program. It is difficult to see how counsel for Detroit
Edison kept a straight face while arguing that his clients were
"compelled" to maintain the free light bulb program, having never
attempted to show that they had filed with the Commission a
petition to abandon it.
188. 428 U.S. at 585.
189. The Chief Justice would have based his decision on this distinction. Id.
at 603-05.
190. Id. at 584.
191. The Court seems to have jumped back into the thicket in Bates &
O'Steen v. State Bar, supra note 150, at 4898, by distinguishing Cantor on the

ground that in the present case "the State's supervision was so active." Since the
Court also found that the prohibition on advertising by lawyers was also an
"affirmative command" of the Arizona Supreme Court, the significance of the

active supervision is not readily apparent.
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A second factor which vitiated compulsion in Cantor was the
fact that the "respondent initiated the program years before the
regulation agency was even created."' 92 In Asheville Tobacco
Board of Trade, Inc. v. F.T.C., the legislature of North Carolina
authorized "local tobacco boards to make reasonable rules and
regulations for the economic and efficient handling of the sale of
leaf tobacco at auction.'

9 3 The

rules included provisions limiting

the number of days each warehouse could sell tobacco. A warehouse owner who was dissatisfied with his time allocation brought
suit alleging Sherman Act violations. Among the considerations
deemed relevant by the court in deciding that Parkerv. Brown was
inapplicable was the fact that local tobacco boards of trade had
existed for many years at common law in North Carolina.'94 While
there was no doubt that warehousemen were "compelled" to abide
by the regulations limiting selling times, the pre-existing nature of
the arrangements raised some question about whether compulsion
really existed or whether the situation fit neatly within the
Northern Securities rule-an attempt at "state immunization" of
private conduct. 9 5 The fact that Detroit Edison continued the
identical free light bulb program before and after becoming the
subject of regulation is persuasive evidence that the program was
not compelled by the State.'
192.

Id. at 594.

193. 263 F.2d at 505. Paradoxically, the North Carolina legislation provided
that the authorized regulations not be "in restraint of trade." N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 106-465.
194. See Gray v. Central Warehouse Co., 181 N.C. 166, 106 S.E. 657 (1921).
195. See, e.g., Marnell v. United Parcel Service of America, Inc., 260 F. Supp.
at 406-10; Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 497 F.2d at 6 n.11.
196. Another case in which compulsion appeared to be present but was not is
Woods Exploration & ProducingCo. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286
(5th Cir. 1971). That case involved the regulation of natural gas production by
the Texas Railroad Commission. Binding monthly production quotas were determined on the basis of producer's forecasts filed with the Commission by operators
having wells in the field. Defendant allegedly filed false forecasts that became the
basis of production orders depriving plaintiff of its correct production quota.
Having found that the forecasts were false, the Fifth Circuit held that the prerequisite of state compulsion was missing because the real decision makers were
not public officials since their decisions were actually ministerial acts based entirely upon data supplied by private businessmen. Id. at 1295. For the argument
that Parkerdoes not require that the State decisions be soundly based on facts,
see 10 WAKE FOREST L. REv. at 583, citing Handler, supra note 132.
For an alternatipe reading of Woods arguing that when the Commission rubber
stamped all industry proposals, it was acting outside the scope of its duties and,
therefore, no state action can result, see Note, 50 B.U.L. REv. 393, 415 (1970).
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C. Present Status of the ParkerDoctrine
Cantor nearly overruled Parker.97 If it had, the state action defense would have been eliminated from United States antitrust
law. According to Cantor, Parker may now be invoked only by
state officials. Five Justices disagreed with this narrowing of
Parker, however, and thus left open the questions of whether, and
under what circumstances, the doctrine might be available to a
defendant who is not a state official. This interpretation has now
been made more plausible by the recent case of Bates and O'Steen
v. State Bar of Arizona'98 where the Court introduced the concept
of the "real party in interest" and treated a suit against the State
Bar as a suit against the Arizona Supreme Court. In Bates the
Court noted that "the appellee [the State Bar] acts as the agent
of the court under its continuous supervision." It is clear that while
the State Bar was the agent of the state, it was not a state official
or a state agency as those terms have been utilized. Thus, Bates
can be read as having reopened the question of the availability of
the Parker doctrine to nongovernmental organizations. Assuming
that the state is found to be a "real party in interest," a court's
analysis will focus on what Goldfarb termed the threshold question-whether the defendant's alleged anticompetitive behavior
was compelled by the state. The court must ask whether "the
option to have . . .such a program is primarily respondent's.' ' 199
Evidence helpful in answering this question will include preregulation behavior and the behavior of other entities subject to
the regulatory scheme. Ultimately, however, although its articulation had to await Cantor, the test will remain what it has always
been since Parker-whether holding a defendant liable for its anticompetitive behavior would be unfair or unjust.
IV.

THE SUGAR CASES AND PARKER

A.

v. BROWN COMPARED

Similarities

Even the casual observer cannot help but notice an uncanny
similarity between these two cases. It is almost as if the Court of
Justice waited for a similar case to announce an analogous doctrine. Both cases deal with agricultural programs instituted by
197. The Cantor Court makes this clear by emphasizing that in Goldfarb it
characterized the doctrine as "this so-called state action exemption." 428 U.S.
at 600.
198.
199.

See note 150 supra.
Id. at 594.
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subordinate political institutions where the principal political bodies have spoken both in the substantive area-agriculture-as well
as in the area of competition. Thus, the California Prorate legislation can be equated with the Italian regulations, and the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act plays the role of Regulation
1009/67 on the Common Market Organization for Sugar. Given this
parallel, perhaps the best way to analyze the extent to which
United States jurisprudence can shed light on the Sugar Cases is
to treat those cases as if they were Parker and retrace our discussion of Parker,using the facts of the Sugar Cases, rather than the
problems of Farmer Brown.
Under the narrowest reading of Parker,the Sherman Act applies
only to persons, a term not intended by Congress to include states.
This was not directly in issue in the Sugar Cases since Italy was
not a party to the action. Article 85 does, however, speak of
"undertakings," a term that could reasonably be interpreted to
exclude Member States. Nonetheless, there has never been any
doubt that the competition rules apply to the Member States."'0
Beyond the definitional argument, we considered whether the
Parker defense is only available when there is a "consistent federal
program of at least equal dignity" with the Sherman Act. In the
Sugar Cases the sugar producers argued that the Italian regulations were "consistent" with Regulation 1009/67 because both
gave priority to the well-being of sugar growers,20 and Regulation
1009/67 enjoyed equal dignity with EEC competition policy. In
neither case, however, did the issue appear material. It was discussed in the Parker opinion, but, as noted above, in the preemption rather than antitrust context. In the Sugar Cases it was never
mentioned.
B. Approval versus Compulsion
The critical element in both Parker and the Sugar Cases is the
nexus between government and private conduct. The Court in the
Sugar Cases recognized a defense when the conduct is affected,
when it is encouraged, or when it would not have taken place but
for the government action. The analogous interpretation of
Parker-i.e., the explanation requiring the weakest connection
200. Article 90 of the EEC Treaty provides for the full application of the
competition rules to public enterprises.
201. In both cases the opposing side also argued preemption by the program
of the superior political institution.

242

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 10: 195

between conduct and government-was set forth in Washington
Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., which permitted
the Parker defense when the defendant's "activities.

.

.fall under

state supervision." ' To plaintiff's argument that the state agency
with jurisdiction had "made no investigations and gave no affirmative approval" of defendant's conduct, the court responded that it

was permissible, indeed "more likely. . . that silence means consent ... ."I" Thus, the rule of Washington Gas Light is that

Parker is available when the state has approved the defendant's
conduct.
There are analogous elements of approval in the Sugar Cases, in
particular the Court's cryptic reference to the unnamed senior Italian official who informed the French-led export cartel of the need
to harmonize supplies in the discussion of the Italian government's
desire that importers proceed "in a rationalized way." There is,
however, an important distinction between Washington Gas Light
and the Sugar Cases. Although both may involve a weak form of
government approval, the particular source of approval is crucial.
In Washington Gas Light, approval emanated from a state body
explicitly designed to oversee competition in utility services. Thus,
it is possible for a court to say that the Sherman Act's protection
will not be extended to cases dealing with a state agency with a
similar concern; i.e., preserving competition. In the Sugar Cases
the Italian agencies were not concerned with competition, but with
ensuring an adequate supply of sugar. Thus, if article 85 could not
reach the Italian situation because of government actions, there
was no functionally equivalent Italian agency to perform the role
of supervising competition. But since Italy has no antitrust law,
this was an inappropriate case for the Court of Justice holding that
article 85 does not extend to practices approved by national authorities.
Although the lower United States courts have explored other
phrases for the relationship between government regulation and
private conduct, the Supreme Court seems to have finally settled
the issue in Goldfarb by its use of the term "compelled.

2

4

This,

of course, resembles thb Commission's view in the Sugar Cases
that the conduct must be "indispensible" to the Italian regula202.
203.
204.
already

See note 185 supra.
438 F.2d at 252.
See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. at 592-93. ("The Court has
decided that the state authorization, approval, encouragement, or participation ... confers no anti-trust immunity.") (Footnotes omitted.)
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tions. While the Commission's view undoubtedly emanates from
a desire to narrowly restrict the availability of this defense, the
Supreme Court's use of the term "compelled" is the product of 30
years of unsuccessful attempts to apply any other term. To permit,
for example, state approval to be the trigger for the Parkerdoctrine
would open the door to all kinds of trivia evidencing approval and
would lead to the point reached in Washington Gas Light where
approval was held to be the absence of disapproval. Given the
natural lethargy of bureaucracy, this reading could make the state
action defense an enormous loophole in antitrust policy. But even
the adoption of a standard like "compulsion" or "indispensible"
will not end the difficulty, for if compulsion is not read to mean
state approval-either before or after the alleged anticompetitive
act-it comes very close to the legislative intent test. The Parker
defense should only be available when the state explicitly directs
the creation of the institution attacked; for example, the minimum
fee schedules in Goldfarb or the joining together of Italian importers and French and Belgian exporters in the Sugar Cases. Even in
Parker,however, this test would not have been met since that case
dealt with an enabling act that authorized the use of restrictions
in marketing programs, but did not order that they be incorporated.
C. The Inevitable Result Test
The fact pattern in the Sugar Cases and, presumably, in most
United States and EEC cases involving the state action doctrine,
is a step removed from an explicit legislative intent. Thus, in the
Sugar Cases it was not alleged that the Italian government directed the importers and exporters to combine forces and act
through a single agent, but rather that the Italian government had
created a set of circumstances that made it "indispensible" that
Eridania would act as sole agent for the Italian importers and that
Sucres et Denrees would act as sole agent for the French and
Belgian exporters. Although this is a permissible reading of the
compulsion standard in Goldfarb, applying this less rigid standard
to a given fact pattern is difficult. For an illustration embracing a
set of circumstances analogous to those in the Sugar Cases, we
might look to Schenley Industries, Inc. v. N.J. Wine & Spirit
Wholesalers Association."5
The State of New Jersey regulated the prices of liquor sold in
205.

272 F. Supp. 872 (D.N.J. 1967).
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that state by requiring that every 90 days manufacturers list the
prices at which they would sell to wholesalers as well as their
minimum retail prices for each of their products. Wholesalers were
required to file the prices at which they would sell to retailers. Both
manufacturers and wholesalers were obligated to offer liquor at the
filed prices to all buyers without discrimination. The purpose of
this price regulation system was "the preservation of an orderly
market so as to prevent cutthroat competition . .2.0.6I" Plaintiff,
Schenley, desired to increase its market share in New Jersey by
lowering its price to consumers. It proposed to defendants that the
cost reduction be shared equally by the manufacturer and the
wholesalers. While some wholesalers were amenable to the suggestion, the majority rejected the proposal. Schenley then sued alleging a Sherman Act violation, and the wholesalers defended by
invoking, inter alia, Parkerv. Brown. Schenley argued that defendants conspired to fix prices "to perpetuate uniform and unreasonably high profit margins"2 7 and that "no statute or judicial decision warrants the inference, let alone holds, that New Jersey sanctions price-fixing in the manner alleged. 2 8 The wholesalers, on
the other hand, argued "that since New Jersey provides the vehicle
of Regulation 34 to promote price coordination, any concerted action resulting in uniformity is sanctioned by the State .... ,,219
The court ruled for plaintiffs on the theory that, while "New Jersey
sanctions price uniformity," there was no showing that New Jersey
approved "any means collectively taken by the wholesalers to that
end." 2 " In particular, there was no showing that New Jersey sanctioned coercion to achieve price uniformity.'
Note the similarity of the wholesalers' argument and the argument of the importers and exporters in the Sugar Cases, in which
it was alleged that the system of bidding for import quotas and the
206. 272 F. Supp. at 879.
207. Id. at 877.
208. Id. at 879.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 880.
211. The Court distinguished Parkerv. Brown with the observation that "New
Jersey's encouragement of price stability. . . falls far short of the express delegation to the raisin growers [of the power] to propose and approve the proration
plan. Further, the Supreme Court emphasized that it was still the State of California which had to give final approval and enforce the program." Id. at 882n.16.
The distinction seems a close one, particularly since the State Department of
Alcoholic Beverage Control enforces compliance with suggested retail prices. Id.
at 876.
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establishment of government price ceilings in the Italian market
inevitably led to combinations of importers and exporters. In both
cases the courts were called upon to evaluate the link between the
alleged cause and effect, not in logical terms, but rather in terms
of predictable business reaction. The issue was: How would the
normal businessman react to these government policies? The modifier "normal" is required to eliminate the possibility that a businessman will act in an anticompetitive way if given the slightest
excuse or chance to get away with it.
Application of this test to the New Jersey liquor wholesalers'
conduct makes their case seem stronger than the court perceived
it to be. New Jersey had decided that there would be only one price
to wholesalers and uniform prices from wholesalers to retailers.
Since there was only one manufacturer, he alone determined his
desired selling price. But there were 27 wholesalers. How then
would they agree on their selling price under the State scheme?
The New Jersey "[r]egulations provide a brief inspection period
after the prices are initially posted, in which wholesalers can examine all posted prices and raise or lower their own competing prices.
Once adjusted, the new prices then become binding ....
"212 This
provision was designed to eliminate price competition at the
wholesale level. But what of the initial price setting? What if a
wholesaler wishes to set a price lower than that of another
wholesaler? This is permissible under the regulations and, given
New Jersey's desire for price uniformity, would result in wholesale
prices being set at the lowest common denominator. The New
Jersey regulations, however, evidence no desire to increase the retailers' profits at the expense of wholesalers. Therefore, the normal
business result of the New Jersey regulations is some form of coordination of prices among wholesalers. In fact, the New Jersey regulations can be viewed as a vehicle for facilitating this coordination
in the face of a natural reluctance of competing wholesalers to do
SO.
The Schenley case illustrates the difficulties encountered in
applying the "inevitable result" test when inevitability is a function of business decision-making. This field is difficult for courts
to probe, and its boundaries are almost infinite. Thus, while the
"inevitable result" test and the "compulsion" test may seem to
lend themselves to more rigorous analysis than connectors such as
"affect," "encourage," "prompt," or "flow from, 2 1 3 experience in
212.
213.

Id. at 877.
Id. at 879.
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United States courts holds no promise for the European Court of
Justice that a viable legal rule lies down these paths. Cantor, in
fact, can fairly be read as an abandonment of the search for a
definitive connector between state action and private conduct.
D. The Agency Test
A better possibility for both United States and EEC jurisprudence was suggested by the First Circuit in George R. Whitten, Jr.,
Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc.,2 " in which it stated the issue
as "whether the real decision-makers were public officials or private businessmen." The Supreme Court spoke similarly in discussing "unfairness" in the Cantor opinion. According to the Court,
"unfairness" is established if it is shown that "the State's participation in a decision is so dominant that it would be unfair to hold
a private party responsible ...

.215 On the other hand, when the

respondent's participation in the decision is sufficiently significant, the Sherman Act is applicable. Although discussed in the
context of "unfairness," the same inquiries arise in implementing
the Court's second ground for possible exemption of the Sherman
Act-legislative intent. All nine Justices agreed in Cantor that
Congress did not intend that the Sherman Act should apply to
"the sovereign State itself" or to its officials. Five Justices disagreed, however, that this was the outer limit of Parker and thus
left the possibility that Parkermight extend to state agents-nonofficials whose otherwise illegal anticompetitive behavior is immunized by Parker. Whether a party is immunized depends upon
whether his "participation in the decision [to behave anticompetitively] is sufficiently significant" to consider him a co-venturer
and, thus, responsible for his conduct, or whether the "[s]tate's
participation in a decision is so dominant" that he can realistically
be viewed as the agent of the state. The question is whether the
private parties have become agents of the state for antitrust purposes. The obvious advantage of this approach over the
"unfairness" approach is that there is a well-established body of
law dealing with the relationship between government and private
conduct.
The framework for analysis within the EEC would be as follows.
In EEC competition cases involving agricultural products, Regulation 26 provides that articles 85 and 86 do not apply to "national
214.
215.

424 F.2d at 33 n.8.
428 U.S. at 594, 595.
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market organizations." In the Sugar Cases the Court should thus
have determined (1) whether a national market organization for
sugar in Italy existed; and (2) whether the sugar companies had
been incorporated into that organization and thus had become
agents of the state (or, more particularly, agents of the market
organization). If both questions were answered affirmatively, no
violation of article 85 should have been found.
E.

The Difference in United States and EEC Competition Policy

The agency test may well be easier for companies to accept than
the indispensibility test suggested by the Commission or the compulsion test suggested by the Court in Cantor. One can volunteer
to become an agent. Will, then, the result of the proposed analysis
create a gaping loophole in EEC competition policy? The distinction between United States and EEC competition policy becomes
significant in answering this question. In an American case the
agency aspect of the analysis is the focal point since the Sherman
Act does not apply to states. In the EEC, on the other hand,
labeling, a company an agent of the state or determining that a
company's conduct was compelled by the state does not result in
the nonapplicability of article 85 since that article (except for Regulation 26) applies even to the action of states. Thus, what is at
issue in an EEC case is the viability under article 85 of a state
program of which the company's conduct is a part. The thrust of
the Commission's future challenges must be directed, not against
a company, but against the Member State into whose program the
company has been incorporated. Proceeding against the company
alone can only result in the kind of convoluted opinion handed
down in the Sugar Cases. Future cases of this type should thus
proceed under article 169, which explicitly provides for Commission proceedings against Member States who fail to fulfill an obligation under the Treaty. In evaluating the Member State's program the Commission will determine whether the Member State
has incorporated private companies into its program as agents of
the state. If so, the program will be analyzed as a totality with the
private companies' conduct considered an integral part of the state
program. On the other hand, if the companies' conduct is not the
result of an agency relationship with a Member State's program,
that conduct itself can be measured against the article 85
standard.
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CONCLUSION

Once it concluded that the Sherman Act did not apply to the
states, the United States Supreme Court apparently found it necessary to hold that the Act did not reach agents of the state or those
whose action was compelled by the state. The state action defense
to an antitrust proceeding was thus created. In Cantor, at least
four Justices decided they did not like the results of this experiment, and they virtually put an end to the state action defense.
The Court of Justice of the European Communities was not similarly pressured to find a state action defense to proceedings under
articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty, but, nonetheless, did so in the
Sugar Cases. Having pronounced the doctrine in 1942, the United
States Supreme Court remained silent on the subject until 1975,
when in Goldfarb it decided the doctrine was inapplicable to a
minimum fee schedule promulgated by a state bar association.
One year later in Cantorthe doctrine was completely emasculated.
Hopefully, the Court of Justice will not wait so long to define the
parameters of the EEC state action defense. In making its next
pronouncement on the issue the Court of Justice can benefit from
United States experience, which manifests the difficulty of articulating criteria for the availability of the defense. The Court of
Justice might mind the lesson of Cantor and conclude that the
state action defense should not be allowed in an article 85 or 86
proceeding, particularly since those articles apply equally to the
conduct of Member States and their agents. If the Court of Justice
does establish the state action defense as a permanent feature of
EEC policy, United States experience suggests that it should
adopt a state agency rather than a state action analysis.

